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The Treatment of Employment Discrimination
Claims in Bankruptcy: Priority Status, Stay
Relief, Dischargeability, and Exemptions
BY: JOANNE GELFAND, ESQ.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy courts, facing a surge in claims stemming from
employment discrimination, are slowly exploring the impact of this area
of law on case administration. An inherent conflict exists between the
policies underlying employment discrimination and bankruptcy laws.
On the one hand, employment discrimination laws seek to protect
employees by making them whole for losses suffered, while at the same
time deterring management from discriminating again. Conversely, the
bankruptcy reorganization process stresses rehabilitation of the debtor
and equality of distribution among the claimants. Although the Bank-
ruptcy Code (the "Code")1 affords some protection to victims of dis-
crimination, their claims are not afforded special treatment under the
bankruptcy laws. Low dollar distributions on discrimination claims
eviscerates the rehabilitative and deterrent goals of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 19642 and state discrimination statutes. The swelling tide
of insolvencies involving parties to discrimination lawsuits warrants an
analysis of both the treatment of employment discrimination claims in
bankruptcy and the impact of these claims on the bankruptcy process.
* Joanne Gelfand is Of Counsel to the Florida law firm of Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson,
P.A. and a resident in their Fort Lauderdale office. She practices in the areas of bankruptcy and
creditors' rights. As President of the Manhattan employment consulting firm, Workplace
Consultants, Inc., Ms. Gelfand performed diversity training programs for management and staff
and conducted workplace investigations. Ms. Gelfand received her Juris Doctorate from the
University of Miami School of Law cum laude and her Master of Laws in Labor and Employment
Law from New York University School of Law. The author thanks her colleague and friend, Lisa
Napoletano for her comments and support; her employment law mentor, Professor Samuel
Estreicher; and her research assistants, Talee Zur and Jennifer Scherer. This article is dedicated to
the memory of Professor Lawrence P. King, a celebrated bankruptcy scholar and the consummate
bankruptcy historian as well as a down-to-earth, softhearted, loving soul.
1. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
3. There is a dearth of publications on the topic and related topics. See generally Mette H.
Kurth, An Unstoppable Mandate and an Immovable Policy: the Arbitration Act and the
Bankruptcy Code Collide, 43 UCLA L. REv. 999 (1996) (discussing the conflict between the
statutory grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts and the mandate of the Federal Arbitration Act,
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-17 (1994), that arbitration provisions 'be strictly enforced and concluding that a
narrower assertion of bankruptcy court jurisdiction is appropriate to resolve the seeming statutory
conflict).
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This article begins with a basic review of the bankruptcy process
and the Code's scheme for payment of claims. Initially, this article will
discuss the priority status of discrimination claims. Thereafter, the
application of the automatic stay to employment discrimination claims
and possible grounds for stay relief are examined. These issues arise in
cases involving both corporate and individual debtors. Finally, this arti-
cle will explore the potential methods to except employment discrimina-
tion claims from the debtor's discharge, including present day principles
of collateral estoppel and the ability to exempt employment discrimina-
tion claims in bankruptcy. These are issues unique to bankruptcy cases
involving individual debtors.4
The primary aim of this article is to provide a road map for practi-
tioners representing both creditors and debtors in bankruptcy cases
involving employment discrimination claims. It will also offer
lawmakers a few brief suggestions on resolving the conflict between
employment and bankruptcy laws.'
II. BASIC BANKRUPTCY PRINCIPLES AND PRIORITY OF
PAYMENTS TO CREDITORS
The Code is a compilation of federal statutes contained in Title 11
of the United States Code governing the bankruptcy process.6 A bank-
ruptcy case may be commenced voluntarily by an eligible debtor filing a
petition for relief.7 The voluntary petition constitutes the "order for
relief."8 In other words, no court action is necessary for many provi-
sions of the Code that afford the debtor "relief' from creditors to spring
into effect. A case may also be commenced involuntarily by the requi-
site number of eligible creditors filing a petition against a debtor under
4. A companion paper contemplated by the author will explore the estimation of
discrimination claims in bankruptcy, the potential for an award of attorneys' fees in favor of
discrimination claimants, allowance of punitive damages, grounds for appointment of a trustee
where management engages in employment discrimination, a trustee's standing to prosecute
employment discrimination claims, and related confirmation issues.
5. At the time of writing this paper the proposed amendments to the Code are in utter flux
because the Democrats assumed control of Senate, the United States is at war against terrorism,
and the biggest bankruptcy case in history, In re Enron Corp., is fostering criticism of the
proposed amendments. Last year, the House of Representatives and Senate passed different
versions of a bill to revise the Code, neither of which will impact the treatment of employment
discrimination claims. See S.R. 420, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 333, 107th Cong. (2001).
6. Cases commenced prior to October 1, 1978 are governed by the now repealed Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, as amended, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978) [hereinafter the
"Act"].
7. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
8. Id. The so-called "order for relief' provides the debtor with the fundamental relief
available under the Code, such as imposition of the automatic stay.
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chapters 7 or 11 of the Code.9 In an involuntary case, an "order for
relief' is entered by the court when the case is not controverted or after
trial when the petitioning creditors establish that the debtor is not paying
its debts as they become due where such debts are not the subject of a
bona fide dispute.1° Within fifteen days after entry of the "order for
relief," the debtor must file its schedules and statements of financial
affairs. These are official forms that identify all the debtor's creditors
and describe the debtor's assets and liabilities."' The commencement of
the case creates a bankruptcy estate, which includes all of the debtor's
legal or equitable interests in property as of that date.'2 Individual debt-
ors, however, may exempt certain property from the estate.' 3 Exempt
property is not subject (during or after the bankruptcy case) to any of the
debtor's debts that arose, or are determined to have arisen, before the
commencement of the case. 4 In his schedules, the debtor must identify
all property, including lawsuits, he claims as exempt. 5 Objections to
the debtor's claimed exemptions must be timely filed or the exemption
will not be allowed.' 6
The Code contains five chapters pursuant to which a debtor may
seek relief, to wit, chapters 7, 9, 11, 12, and 13.11 Chapter 7, the most
frequently utilized chapter, provides for liquidation of the debtor's non-
exempt assets by a trustee appointed from a panel of private trustees.' 8
The chapter 7 trustee is charged with administering the estate, which
includes: liquidating the assets; accounting for property received; inves-
tigating the financial affairs of the debtor; and objecting to the allowance
9. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1994).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h) (1994).
11. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1994).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1994 & Supp. V. 1999).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) (1994 & Supp. V. 1999).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 522(1) (1994 & Supp. V. 1999). See Pealo v. AAF McQuay, Inc., No. 99-
CV-1690, 2001 WL 535967 (N.D.N.Y. May 7, 2001) (debtor must list on his schedules cause of
action based on gender discrimination).
16. See In re Taylor, 503 U.S. 638 (1992). The debtor in the case of In re Taylor claimed as
exempt the proceeds of a lawsuit alleging her employer discriminated against her on the basis of
both race and sex. Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, found that the exemption must be
allowed where no objections to the claimed exemption was timely filed, notwithstanding it was
undisputed that the debtor was not entitled to exempt more than a small portion of the proceeds.
Id. at 642. The debtor successfully shielded $110,000 paid in settlement of her discrimination
claims. Id.
17. The remaining chapters 1, 3, and 5 concern case commencement and administration.
18. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 704 (1994). The panel is comprised of persons appointed by the
United States Trustee to serve on the panel. 28 U.S.C. § 586(1) (1994). A United States Trustee
is appointed by the Attorney General to serve in each federal judicial district and supervise the
administration of cases and trustees under chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13 of the Code. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 581, 586 (1994).
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Chapter 11 involves a reorganization of the debtor's debts through
a plan of reorganization confirmed (approved) by the court.20 Unless a
trustee is appointed by the court, the debtor remains in possession of its
assets and is referred to as a debtor-in-possession. 2' The debtor-in-pos-
session is charged with administering the chapter 11 case, which
includes investigating the: acts; conduct; assets; liabilities; and financial
affairs of the debtor and filing a plan.22
Both corporations and individuals are eligible to seek relief under
chapters 7 and 11.23 This Article addresses employment discrimination
claims in relation to these two chapters24 available to both non-munici-
pal corporations and individuals.2
In addition to the exemptions for individual debtors, the Code
affords certain other fundamental relief to debtors - the automatic stay
and the discharge. The automatic stay is imposed at the time a case is
commenced barring, inter alia, the commencement or continuation of
any judicial or administrative actions against the debtor.26 The auto-
matic stay, however, does not operate to stay the commencement or con-
tinuation of proceedings by governmental units to enforce their police or
regulatory power or to enforce nonmonetary judgments.27
19. 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1994).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1994). A plan providing for liquidation of the debtor's assets is
permitted. 11 U.S.C. § 123(b)(4) (1994). Often, a chapter. 11 liquidating plan is preferred to a
liquidation under chapter 7 because in a chapter II liquidation plan the debtor's assets may be
sold as a going concern, thereby increasing their value. Also, although the debtor-in possession
continues to incur operating expenses, the expenses of a trustee are eliminated.
21. 11 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994).
22. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1106-07 (1994).
23. 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(b)-(d), 101(41) (1994).
24. The remaining chapters apply only to individuals with regular income, municipalities and
family farmers. II U.S.C. § 109(e) (1994). Chapter 13 provides for adjustment of the debts of an
individual. Only individuals with regular income that owe on the date of the filing of the petition
noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of less than $269,250 and noncontingent, liquidated,
secured debts of less than $807,750 are eligible to seek relief under chapter 13. See also 11
U.S.C. § 109(e) (1994). Chapter 9 provides for the adjustment of debts of a municipality. Only a
municipality is eligible to seek relief under chapter 9. See also 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (1994).
Chapter 12 provides for adjustment of the debts of a family farmer with regular annual income.
Only a family farmer with regular annual income is eligible to seek relief under chapter 12.
25. 11 U.S.C. § 109(f) (1994).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. V. 1999).
27. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(4), (b)(5) (1994 & Supp. V. 1999). The automatic stay does not bar
proceedings by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and state human rights
commissions. See EEOC v. McLean Trucking, Co., 834 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1987) (recognizing
that suits by EEOC against debtor to redress alleged unlawful age and racial discrimination were
brought under agency's police and regulatory power and are not stayed); EEOC v. Hall's Motor
Transit Co., 789 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1986) (ruling that proceeding by EEOC against debtor
alleging racial discrimination not stayed); EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318 (8th Cir.
1986) (holding that suit by EEOC alleging sex discrimination i$ not stayed); In re Mohawk
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A chapter 7 discharge relieves the debtor of all debts arising before
the date of the order for relief.28 Under chapter 7, only individuals are
eligible to receive a discharge.29 Under chapter 11, the debtor is
relieved of all debts arising before confirmation of a plan.3" In certain
circumstances, claims arising against individual debtors before the filing
of the petition (pre-petition claims) are deemed nondischargeable and as
a result the debtor is not relieved of his obligation to pay those debts.3
In both chapter 7 and 11 cases, every creditor may file a proof of
claim attesting to the amount it alleges it is due from the debtor.32 Such
a claim is deemed allowed unless a party in interest timely objects to the
claim.33 In a chapter 1 1 case, a proof of claim is deemed filed when it is
listed in the debtor's schedules, unless the claim is listed on the schedule
as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated.34
The Code establishes a scheme for prioritizing creditor's claims
against the estate.3 Administrative expenses, defined as "the actual,
necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including wages,
salaries, or commissions for services rendered after the commencement
of the case," are paid first.36 "Gap" claims arise in involuntary cases.
These are claims resulting from the debtor's ordinary course of business
or financial affairs after the commencement of the case, but before the
appointment of a trustee or the order for relief (whichever is earlier).
Greenfield Motel Corp., 239 B.R. I (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999) (entry of back pay award by
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination fell within the police and regulatory powers of
governmental unit and was excepted from the automatic stay); In re Pincombe, 256 B.R. 774
(Bankr. N.D. IIl. 2000) (holding that an automatic stay neither requires a withdrawal of claim filed
with the Illinois Department of Human Rights nor acts as a bar to the continuation of the
discrimination proceeding brought against the debtor by the Department on behalf of the alleged
victim).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1994).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (1994). Corporations cease to operate after their liquidation under
chapter 7.
30. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(l)(A) (1994).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2000). Debts that are nondischargeable include: (i) certain pre-petition
taxes; (ii) monies obtained through false pretenses, a false representation, actual fraud, or through
use of a written financial statement that is materially false, published by the debtor with intent to
deceive and reasonably relied upon by the creditor; (iii) alimony, maintenance, and child support;
and (iv) debts for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of
another entity. See infra Part V for a discussion concerning the nondischargeability of
employment discrimination claims based on the willful and malicious exception.
32. 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994).
33. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1994).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (1994).
35. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 726, 1129 (1994).
36. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(A) (1994) (emphasis added). Unless the holder of the claim
agrees otherwise, these claims must be paid on the effective date of the plan. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a)(9)(A) (1994). The effective date is defined in the plan, not the Code, and is typically
thirty days following the confirmation order becoming final and nonappealable.
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Gap claims are paid second. 37 Unsecured claims for pre-petition wages,
salaries, and commissions not exceeding $4,650 that were earned within
ninety days before the date of the filing of the petition or of the date of
the cessation of the debtor's business (whichever occurs first) are paid
third.38 Unsecured claims for contributions to employee benefit plans
not exceeding $4,650 arising from services rendered within 180 days
before the date of the filing of the petition or of the date of the cessation
of the debtor's business (whichever occurs first) are paid fourth.3 9 Other
unsecured claims are paid only after these priority claims are satisfied.4"
The rationale for the Code's priority scheme is that the costs
incurred in administering the bankruptcy case for the benefit of the cred-
itors should be paid first; followed by claims arising pre-petition (such
as claims for wages and other employee compensation) that enabled the
debtor to remain in business for the benefit of its creditors; followed by
other claims of a special nature such as alimony, child support, and
taxes. Administrative expense status is the coveted position among
creditors, including holders of claims stemming from employment dis-
crimination, because general, non-priority, unsecured claims are paid
only to the extent the estate has assets to pay them after payment of
administrative expenses and other priority claims.
Therefore, an analysis of the priority status of employment discrim-
ination claims begins with analysis of whether such claims are entitled
to administrative expense status.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE PRIORITY
Administrative expenses are defined in section 503(b)(1)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Code as, inter alia, the "actual, necessary costs and
expenses of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries ... for ser-
37. II U.S.C. § 502(f) (1994) (defining gap claim); I 1 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2) (1994) (setting out
priority of gap claims). See generally In re Unit Parts Co., 9 B.R. 380 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981)
(explaining in dictum that a claim stemming from unfair labor practices occurring between the
time the involuntary petition was filed and the time the order for relief was entered may have
priority directly behind administrative expenses).
38. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1994). In a chapter II case, these claims must be paid in full on
the effective date unless the class of holders have accepted the plan and agree to deferred cash
payments equal to the amount of the claim. II U.S.C. § I 129(a)(9)(B) (1994). See also 11
U.S.C. § 1126 (1994) (acceptance of plan). Claims are unsecured where the creditor does not
have a lien on property in which the bankruptcy estate has an interest or a right of setoff under the
Code. II U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
39. 11 U.S.C § 507(a)(4) (1994). The sums paid a creditor for wages under section 507(a)(3)
of the Code plus amounts paid on behalf of such employees to any other employee benefit plan are
deducted from the $4,650 cap. Id. The additional claims receiving priority treatment are not
relevant to this article, although it should be noted that certain pre-petition tax obligations are
entitled to priority status. II U.S.C. § 507(8) (1994).
40. 11 U.S.C. §§ 726(a)(1)-(2), 1129(9) (1994).
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vices rendered after the commencement of the case. .. ." Claims
incurred postpetition typically include: the debtor-in-possession or trus-
tee's professional fees; postpetition taxes; wages and contributions to
employee benefit plans earned postpetition; and claims of vendors doing
business with the debtor-in-possession. Granting administrative status
to parties doing business with the debtor and administering the estate
encourages third parties to perform services for and supply goods to the
debtor-in-possession or trustee. This furthers the goal of increasing the
monies available for distribution to the unsecured creditors. 42 Other-
wise, employees, vendors, and professionals, wary of not being paid for
their goods and services, will refuse to transact business with a bankrupt
debtor. This makes it impossible for individuals and companies to reor-
ganize and hinders the ability to attract competent professionals to
administer bankruptcy cases.
Whether damages stemming from employment discrimination are
entitled to administrative expense priority depends on when the discrim-
ination occurred, postpetition or pre-petition.
A. Priority Status for Employment Discrimination Claims Stemming
From Postpetition Misconduct
The Bankruptcy Code does not provide any specific protections to
creditors with claims stemming from employment discrimination. Nev-
ertheless, damages, back pay, and front pay awards arising from dis-
crimination occurring postpetition should be afforded administrative
expense status since fairness dictates that employees discriminated
against postpetition by a debtor-in-possession or trustee be made whole
before the general unsecured creditors for whose benefit the debtor con-
tinues to operate. Also, the payment of discrimination claims incurred
during the bankruptcy case, like traditional tort claims, is part of the
debtor's cost of doing business.
In the landmark decision of Reading Company v. Brown,43 a case
arising under the former Bankruptcy Act (the "Act"), 44 the United States
41. 11 U.S.C. §503(b)(1)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
42. In re Palau Corp., 139 B.R. 942, 944 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1992), affid, 18 F.3d 746 (9th Cir.
1994). Notwithstanding, all too often cases are deemed administratively insolvent meaning that
there are insufficient funds to satisfy the holders of administrative claims. In such cases, the
unsecured creditors do not receive any distribution.
43. 391 U.S. 471 (1968).
44. Reading construed section 64(a)(1) of the previously repealed Act which provided
administrative expense priority for "the costs and expenses of administration, including the actual
and necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate subsequent to filing the petition ......
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 95-598 § 64(a)(1), 30 Stat. 544 563 (1898) (repealed 1978).
The current administrative expense priority in the Code is almost identical to the Act. The Code,
however, eliminates the language "subsequent to the filing of the petition" from the Act and
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court held that tort claims arising during a chapter XI arrange-
ment (analogous to a chapter 11 reorganization under the Code) consti-
tuted "actual and necessary" expenses entitled to administrative
priority.45 In that case, the petitioner, Reading, sought administrative
priority for a claim arising from a fire caused by the undisputed negli-
gence of the receiver in the chapter XI arrangement.46 After the debtor,
Knight Realty, filed bankruptcy, the receiver was elected the trustee in
the bankruptcy.47 The trustee, together with the United States, which
held a claim for unpaid prearrangement taxes superior to the unsecured
claims but inferior to the administrative claims, sought to expunge Red-
ing's claim on the ground that it was not incurred as an expense of
administration.48
The bankruptcy court disallowed Reading's claim as an administra-
tive expense. 49 The court also held that the claim was not provable as a
general unsecured claim since it did not arise prior to the arrangement.5 °
The latter ruling was not challenged by either party. 51 The district court
affirmed the ruling of the bankruptcy court and the en banc Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.52
Construing the provisions for administrative expense priority con-
tained in section 64 of the Act, the Third Circuit reasoned that the
"words 'actual and necessary' require that the expenses be proximately
related to the preservation of the estate and that they must be reasonably
anticipated as a cost of operating the business. '53 The court stated that
not "every post-petition event giving rise to a cost, expense or liability"
is entitled to administrative status.54 Thus, because Reading's tort claim
stemming from the receiver's negligence was not anticipated nor proxi-
mately related to the preservation of the estate, it was not entitled to
administrative status.
instead provides examples of types of administrative expenses, "including wages, salaries, or
commissions for services rendered after the commencement of the case .... I  U.S.C.
§ 503(b)(l)(A) (1994).
45. Reading, 391 U.S. at 482.
46. Id. at 473-74.
47. Id. at 473.
48. Id. at 474-75.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 474. Thus, the bankruptcy court finding that the claim was neither an administrative
expense nor an unsecured claim provided no means of redress to Reading for the admittedly
negligent act of the receiver during the bankruptcy case.
52. In re I.J. Knight Realty Corp., 370 F.2d 624, 628 (3d Cir. 1967), aff'g, 242 F. Supp. 337
(E.D. Pa. 1965).
53. Id. at 628.
54. Id. at 627.
55. Id. at 628.
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The United States Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the contention
that administrative priority should be limited to expenditures without
which the debtor's business could not be carried on because "fairness to
all persons having claims against an insolvent" is the statutory objec-
tive.56 Reading "did not merely suffer injury at the hands of an insol-
vent business: it had an insolvent business thrust upon it by operation of
law."57 Indeed, the trustee continued operating the debtor's business in
the chapter XI arrangement and it was during this time that the fire
occurred.58 Thus, the Court reasoned that the petitioner should collect
ahead of those creditors for whose benefit the continued operation of the
business occurred. 59 Noting that the Act did not specifically define
"actual and necessary" in the context of administrative expenses,6° the
Court found that "actual and necessary" costs should include "costs ordi-
narily incident to operation of a business, and not be limited to costs
without which rehabilitation would be impossible."'61 The Court further
noted that the cost of insurance is an administrative expense and if a
receiver or debtor-in-possession is encouraged to obtain adequate insur-
ance, the claim insured against should be payable in full. 6z Although
Reading involved a tort claim, its reasoning is fully applicable to
employment discrimination claims. No reported decision explores its
application in this context, however.
Relying on Reading, the First Circuit in Spunt v. Charlesbank
Laundry, Inc. (In re CharlesBank Laundry, Inc.), 63 held that an attor-
ney's fee award for postpetition services rendered to creditors stemming
from the debtor's intentional act of violating an injunction entered pre-
petition is entitled to administrative priority.' The injunction at issue
enjoined the debtor from operating its laundry to the detriment of the
plaintiffs and others. 65 Fairness dictated that damages stemming from
the intentional act of violating the injunction be paid ahead of pre-reor-
ganization claims.66
Notwithstanding the increase in employment discrimination claims
in bankruptcy, only one decision, Kapernekas v. Continental Airlines,
56. Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 477 (1968), rev'd sub nom, In re I.J. Knight Realty
Corp., 370 F.2d 624 (3d Cir. 1967).
57. Reading, 391 U.S. at 478.
58. Id. at 473.
59. See id. at 478.
60. Id. at 476.
61. Id. at 483.
62. Id.
63. 755 F.2d 200 (1st Cir. 1985).
64. Id. at 203.
65. Id. at 201.
66. Id. at 203.
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Inc. (In re Continental Airlines, Inc.), 67 directly addresses administrative
priority for such claims. This case, however, dealt with the priority of
damages accruing postpetition stemming from a pre-petition injury, and
thus the case lacks precedential value for postpetition discrimination.68
Nonetheless, analogous decisions construing the administrative expense
status of severance pay claims based on length of employment as well as
the status of claims based on violations of the Worker Adjustment and
Restraining Notification Act (WARN) are instructive.
There is a split of authority among the courts of appeals on the
issue of the treatment of severance pay claims based on the length of
employment that stem from an employee's postpetition termination of
employment. The majority view adheres to the central purpose of the
administrative expense priority, holding that severance pay claims based
on length of employment will be accorded administrative status only to
the extent that services are rendered postpetition.69 In the seminal case
espousing the majority view, In re Mammoth Mart,7" which was decided
under the Act, the First Circuit held that severance claims should be
afforded administrative claim status only to the "extent that the consider-
ation supporting the claimant's right to payment was both supplied to
and beneficial to the debtor-in-possession in the operation of the busi-
ness."'" The claimants in the case of In re Mammoth Mart were
employees of the debtor/discount department store chain who were dis-
67. 148 B.R. 207 (Bankr. D. Del. 1992).
68. Id. at 209. In other reported decisions involving employment discrimination claims the
court was not required to explore the issue of administrative priority. See, e.g., Kresmery v. Serv.
Am. Corp., 227 B.R. 10 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998) (employment discrimination claim arising
postpetition premised on a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
234 (1994), was discharged by confirmation of employer's bankruptcy plan where employee
failed to seek administrative priority); McSherry v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 81 F.3d 739 (8th
Cir. 1996) (determing that claim premised on violation of the ADA arose pre-petition when
termination occurred, not post-petition when right to sue letter from the EEOC was received); In
re Paolino, No. Civ. A. 93-6346, 1995 WL 548989 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 1995) (recognizing that
issue of whether a sexual harassment claim gives rise to an administrative expense is "novel,"
however, resolution was unnecessary since the court only needed to determine if the bankruptcy
judge abused his discretion in approving the settlement providing for administrative priority of
postpetition employment discrimination claim). See also Official Com. of Unsecured Creditors v.
United Healthcare Sys., Inc. (In re United Healthcare Sys., Inc.), 200 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 1999)
(holding that debtor-in-possession who failed to give employees notice of lay-off under the
Worker Adjustment Retraining Notification Act (WARN) was not an employer under WARN,
thus, precluding the award of administrative expense priority for WARN damages and the court
did not review the propriety of awarding administrative expense priority for the claims).
69. See In re Roth Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 1992); Lines v. Sys. Bd. of Adjustment
No. 94 Bhd. of Ry. Airline & Steamship Clerks (In re Health Maint. Found.), 680 F.2d 619 (9th
Cir. 1982); Cramer v. Mammoth Mart, Inc. (In re Mammoth Mart, Inc.), 536 F.2d 950 (1st Cir.
1976); In re Public Ledger, Inc., 161 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1947).
70. 536 F.2d. 950 (1st Cir. 1976).
71. Id. at 954.
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charged after the filing of the petition under chapter XI.72 Each claimant
received up to four weeks severance pay and sought administrative
expenses status for additional severance pay, asserting that it had been
the debtor's policy prior to its chapter XI to pay severance pay of one
week's salary for each week of employment "subject to no maximum."73
The First Circuit held that the additional severance claims were properly
denied administrative priority because no part of the claims arose from
services performed for the debtor-in-possession.74
The In re Mammoth Mart court relied on the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Reading, maintaining that only where the "debtor-in-possession's
actions themselves ... give rise to a legal liability" is the claimant enti-
tled to the priority of the cost and expense of administration.75 Because
the four weeks' severance pay fully compensated the claimants for the
services performed postpetition for the benefit of the debtor-in-posses-
sion, and since the additional severance sought was premised on the
number of weeks the claimants were employed pre-petition, the addi-
tional severance claims were denied administrative priority.76
By contrast, In re Mammoth Mart expressly rejects the minority
view espoused by the Second Circuit in the case of In re Straus-Dupar-
quet.77 According to this decision, severance claims stemming from a
postpetition termination are entitled to administrative priority status
because they represent compensation for the termination of employment
as incident to the administration of the bankruptcy case. 78 The claim-
ants, union employees of the debtor, were fired by the debtor approxi-
mately one month after the bankruptcy petition was filed.79 Reasoning
that severance pay was not earned from day-to-day but accrued when-
ever termination occurred, the Second Circuit held that the severance
pay was an expense of administration.8"
The most recent court of appeals decision addressing the intersec-
72. Id. at 952.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 955.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 952. The Ninth Circuit adopted the majority view in the case of In re Health
Maintenance Foundation, 680 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982). In this case, which was decided under the
Act, the debtor operated several health maintenance organizations and employed both medical and
hospital staff members represented by a union. Id. at 619. It was undisputed that the severance
claims were earned before the bankruptcy filing. Id. at 621. In denying administrative status for
these claims the Ninth Circuit relied upon In re Mammoth Mart, reasoning that "none of the
consideration supporting [the] claims was either supplied to or beneficial to the trustee." Id.
77. Straus-Duparquet, Inc. v. Local Union No. 3 Int'l Bhd. Of Elec. Workers (In re Straus-
Duparquet, Inc.), 386 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1967).
78. Id. at 651.
79. Id. at 650-51.
80. Id. at 651.
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tion of severance pay claims and the Code sides with the majority view.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the case of In re Roth
America,8 relying on cases decided under the*Act and the language of
the Code, held that granting administrative expense priority to severance
pay claims based on length of employment is consistent with section
503(b) of the Code to the extent that the "benefits were earned by ser-
vices rendered post-petition."82 In the facts of In re Roth America, a
union representing workers employed by a debtor/toy manufacturer both
pre-petition and postpetition sought administrative expense priority for
severance pay following the cessation of the debtor's business and lay
off of all workers approximately six months after the debtor sought
relief under chapter 11.83 The administrative claim was limited to the
pro-rata portion of the severance earned during the six months of the
bankruptcy.84
Ironically, the minority view appears to comport with the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Reading because an employee terminated postpeti-
tion, like the tort victim in Reading, "had an insolvent business thrust
upon it by operation of law."85 Fairness dictates that the terminated
employee is entitled to his complete severance package.
Decisions adopting the majority view on severance claims provided
the precedent for a more recent line of bankruptcy cases involving
claims under WARN.86 In the case of In re Beverage Entertainment,87
for example, the court held that a WARN claim arising from postpetition
actions of the debtor is entitled to administrative priority.88 The court
analogized WARN violations occurring postpetition to the two follow-
ing categories of severance pay claims arising out of postpetition termi-
nation: (i) those payable where an employee is terminated without
receiving the predetermined amount of notification; and (ii) those paya-
ble based upon the length of time the employee has worked for the
employer.89 The court concluded that the first category is granted
administrative expense priority since the severance is fully earned at the
time of postpetition termination. The court adopted the majority view
for the second class of severance claims, requiring that the sums are
earned postpetition.9 ° Applying this severance pay claim analysis to
81. 975 F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 1992).
82. Id. at 958.
83. Id. at 950-51.
84. Id. at 951, 958.
85. Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 478 (1968).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a) (1994).
87. 225 B.R. III (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998).
88. Id. at 115-16.
89. Id. at 115.
90. Id.
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WARN claims, the bankruptcy court held that the employees' WARN
claims were entitled to administrative expense status since the claims
arose and were earned after the filing when employees were terminated
without notice.91
In another WARN case, the court allowed a back pay award arising
under WARN as an administrative expense priority, where the debtor
halted its operations postpetition and laid off plant employees including
union workers.92 The bankruptcy court, in an attempt to satisfy the
administrative expense requirement that wages represent payment for
services "rendered" postpetition, concluded that back pay under WARN
is deemed "earned" upon termination and are therefore, "in the nature of
wages for services rendered" postpetition. 93 Alternatively, relying on
Reading, which did not involve a claim for "wages" but for the "actual
and necessary" expenses of administration, the court found that even if
the back pay did not constitute "wages for services rendered after the
commencement of the case," it would still be entitled to priority as an
expense of administration since "fairness" dictated that persons injured
by the debtor's continued operation be granted administrative priority.94
The court rejected the debtor's contention that Reading was limited to
tort claims, finding that the decision applied to all costs incident to the
operation of a business.95
In the cases concerning postpetition torts, severance pay, and viola-
tions of WARN, the courts support granting administrative expense pri-
ority to claims stemming from employment discrimination occurring
postpetition. It would be inequitable to grant administrative priority to a
postpetition tort claimant while relegating back pay awards relating to
postpetition discrimination to the ranks of the unsecured creditors. This
is especially true where the claimant was performing services at the
debtor's behest when the discrimination occurred. Similar to the tort vic-
tim in Reading, the injured employee has had the debtor hoisted upon
him or her. Fairness dictates that employees discriminated against
postpetition by a debtor-in-possession or trustee be made whole before
the general unsecured creditors for whose benefit the business continued
to operate. Without employees efforts the debtor would cease to do bus-
91. Id. at 116. See also Barnett v. Jamesway Corp. (In re Jamesway Corp.), 235 B.R. 329
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that although employees were terminated postpetition,
employer's obligation to provide WARN notice arose pre-petition and therefore claims were not
entitled to administrative status).
92. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers v. Hanlin Group, Inc. (In re Hanlin Group, Inc.), 176 B.R.
329 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1995). Because the debtor operated under the chapter 11, it was subject to
WARN, Id. at 332.
93. Id. at 334 (emphasis added).
94. Id.
95. Id.
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iness and lose the opportunity of generating future income to pay gen-
eral unsecured creditors.
In cases involving supervisor misconduct, the rule is the same. The
Reading decision rests on the principle of respondeat superior, which
states that the "master" is liable for the negligence of his "servant" when
operating for the benefit of creditors with the hope of rehabilitation.96
The doctrine of respondeat superior was the basis for the Supreme
Court's determination that employers (masters) may be liable for the
discriminatory acts of their supervisors (servants), notwithstanding the
fact that such acts are outside the scope of employment where the
employer is negligent.97
The allowance of administrative expense status, supported by
Reading, is unchanged by the nature or amount of the damage claims.
Generally, discrimination claimants are awarded as equitable relief in
two forms: (i) back pay compensating claimants for wages accruing until
an offer for reinstatement; and (ii) front pay compensating claimants for
the difference between the wages they actually earned and what they
would have earned absent the discrimination.98
Back pay awards stemming from postpetition misconduct should be
entitled to administrative expense priority under section 503, not only as
wages, but as an actual, necessary expense of preserving the estate. 99 It
is indisputable that upon reinstatement the wages earned by the
employee will be entitled to administrative expense status because the
employee is "rendering" services.' 0
96. Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 477-79 (1968). In Reading, the trustee was deemed
to be the debtor's servant.
97. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 758-59 (1998) (holding that an employer
is liable for supervisor's conduct in creating a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII,
but employer may assert affirmative defense that the employer exercised reasonable care to
prevent and promptly correct sexually harassing behavior and that the employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective measures provided by the employer).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994). Front pay is awarded for lost compensation during the
time between judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement. Pollard v. E.I. Du Pont De
Nemours & Co., 533 U.S. __ 121 S.Ct. 1946, 1948 (2001). Compensatory and punitive
damages are also available in cases involving unlawful intentional discrimination 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a (1994).
99. Back pay ceases to accrue if the debtor-in-possession reinstates the claimant. Ford Motor
Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982) (stating that employee claiming sexual discrimination forfeited
her right to back pay by declining employer's unconditional offer of reinstatement). Yet,
reinstatement may pose difficulties in cases in which the debtor is attempting to streamline its
operations. Under chapter 7, reinstatement is generally not an option since the debtor ceases
doing business. The trustee, however, may seek permission to operate for a limited time during
the liquidation where necessary to preserve the estate.
100. In re Hanlin Group, Inc., 176 B.R. 329 (D. N.J. 1995) (supports this proposition as back
pay awards arising from a postpetition WARN violation are construed as an actual, necessary
expense of administration).
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Front pay awards are indistinguishable from back pay awards and
should be treated in the same manner. As the foregoing discussion dem-
onstrates, damages stemming from postpetition discriminatory acts are
entitled to administrative expense priority. The next inquiry is whether
damages accruing postpetition, but stemming from pre-petition discrimi-
natory acts, are also entitled to administrative priority.
B. Administrative Expense Priority for Damages Accruing
Postpetition and Stemming From Pre-Petition Misconduct
Damages stemming from pre-petition misconduct may accrue
postpetition where the pre-petition violation is ongoing and back pay,
front pay, or compensatory damages are incurred after the commence-
ment of the case. These damage claims should not be entitled adminis-
trative expense status as wages because services were not rendered
postpetition. It is arguable, however, that back and front pay accruing
postpetition are entitled to administrative priority as an actual and neces-
sary expense of administering the estate. This is because the debtor-in-
possession has the ability to end the discrimination and the accrual of
back and front pay by making an unconditional offer of reinstatement.
The district court in Continental Airlines held that back pay accru-
ing postpetition is not entitled to administrative expense priority where
the claimant was wrongfully terminated pre-petition.' 0 The claimant,
an airline mechanic, went on strike with other Continental employees in
August 1983. For approximately nine months during the strike he
worked for other airlines performing essentially the same duties as his
duties at Continental. 0 2 In May 1985, at the conclusion of the strike,
Continental contacted the claimant advising him he could return to work
upon passing a physical exam. After the exam the claimant was advised
that his previous back injuries indicated an inability to meet the lifting
requirements of the job, precluding him from being rehired. 10 3
In June 1985, the claimant filed a charge with the Illinois Depart-
ment of Human Relations alleging handicap discrimination. On October
17, 1989 an administrative law judge (ALJ) found in favor of the claim-
ant, determining that his disqualification from employment was based on
eleven-year old surgery that had not previously affected his ability to
perform his job. 0 The ALJ recommended that Continental reinstate the
101. In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 148 B.R. 207, 216 (Bankr. D. Del. 1992). The claimant
relied on section 503(b)(1)(A) of the Code and did not contend that the back pay accruing pre-
petition was entitled to administrative priority in the capped amount as an unsecured claim for
wages incurred pre-petition. II U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1994).
102. In re Continental Airlines, 148 B.R. at 209.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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claimant and award him back pay of $141,709.10, medical expenses,
attorney's fees, and costs. On October 10, 1990, the Illinois Human
Rights Commission affirmed the ALJ's recommendation by adopting it
with minor changes.' 05 On November 9, 1990, Continental petitioned
for rehearing but the petition was denied on February 1, 1991. Thereaf-
ter, Continental filed an appeal from the decision of the Human Rights
Commission with the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. °6 On
December 3, 1990, while its appeal was pending, Continental filed for
bankruptcy relief pursuant to chapter 11. On January 28, 1992, the
Cook County Circuit Court enforced the order and decision of the
Human Rights Commission. Shortly thereafter, the claimant was rein-
stated by Continental.0 7
In the bankruptcy case, the claimant sought allowance and payment
as an administrative expense that portion of his back pay award and
other benefits accruing after Continental filed bankruptcy. The bank-
ruptcy court denied the claimant's motion and the district court
affirmed.10 8 The court found that the only "wages" entitled to adminis-
trative expense priority under the Code were wages earned for actual
services "rendered" to the debtor postpetition, which were necessary for
the preservation of the bankruptcy estate. 10 9 That portion of the peti-
tioner's "back pay" award representing "wages" from the date Continen-
tal filed its bankruptcy proceeding did not represent wages for services
actually rendered to the bankruptcy estate, precluding administrative pri-
ority status.'o
The court rejected the National Labor Relation Board's (NLRB)"'
contention that the back pay was entitled to administrative priority as an
actual, necessary cost of administration because the violation occurred
pre-petition. "2 The court reasoned that Continental's failure to reinstate
the complainant until after it exhausted its appeals, which occurred after
it filed for bankruptcy relief, was not a separate violation that arose
postpetition. It instead reflected Continental's legitimate use of the
appellate process.'"' The court distinguished Reading on the ground
that the tort in Reading occurred postpetition and the cause of action in
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. Continental did not object to treatment of the claim as a general unsecured claim.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 212-13. See II U.S.C. § 503 (b)(l)(A) (1994).
Ill. The NLRB was granted leave to appear as amicus curae because the back pay claim at
issue in the case was similar to back pay orders issued by the NLRB. In re Continental Airlines,
Inc., 148 B.R. at 207.
112. Id. at 217.
113. Id. at 216.
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the instant case arose pre-petition during the rehiring process when the
creditor was wrongfully terminated.114 The court further found that
unlike the tort victim in Reading, the claimant in Continental did not
have an insolvent business thrust upon it. If the business in Reading had
been forced to close, the fire would not have occurred and the petitioner
would not have been injured." 5 Likewise, the claimant awarded admin-
istrative expense priority in the case of In re Charlesbank Laundry
would not have been injured if the laundry had closed. 16
Several decisions address the treatment of back pay awards stem-
ming from unfair labor practices. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for
the Ninth Circuit reached a similar result in NLRB v. Walsh (In re Palau
Corporation)."7 This case involved the NLRB's claim for administra-
tive expense status for a back pay award accruing postpetition and aris-
ing from the debtor's pre-petition unfair labor practice. Narrowly
construing section 503(b)(1)(A), which provides for administrative pri-
ority for the "actual and necessary" expenses of preserving the estate,
the bankruptcy appellate panel found that administrative priority
extended only to expenses which "represent 'services rendered after the
commencement of the case."'' 8 The employees' failure to render ser-
vices to the debtor was fatal in the NLRB's attempt to obtain administra-
tive status for its back pay award. The court refused to undertake an
analysis of whether the back pay constituted an actual and necessary
expense of administration entitled to priority under the reasoning of
Reading and In re Charlesbank Laundry. It instead concluded that back
pay must be treated like "wages" under the Code. Therefore, to get
administrative status, the backpay award must represent services ren-
dered to the debtor postpetition. 119
In NLRB v. Greyhound Lines (In re Eagle Business Manufactur-
ers), '2 the NLRB asserted that back pay accruing that postpetition
resulted from the debtor-in-possession's refusal to reinstate its employ-
ees constituted "constructive wages" entitled to administrative priority
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 755 F.2d 200 (1st Cir. 1985). The pre-petition injunction violated postpetition in the case
of In re Charlesbank Laundry required cessation of the debtor's business. Obviously, the
claimant would not have suffered the injury if the business closed because the debtor would no
longer be operating in violation of a court order.
117. 139 B.R. 942 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 18 F.3d 746 (9th Cir. 1994).
118. Id. at 944 (emphasis added). The court relied on the subsequently vacated decision of In
re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 113 B.R. 187 (Bankr. W. Pa. 1990), that held that employees
who do not perform services postpetition are not entitled to allowance of back pay as an
administrative expense.
119. In re Palau Corp., 139 B.R. at 944-45.
120. 158 B.R. 421 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
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as an actual expense of administration.' 2 ' Furthermore, the failure to
reinstate striking employees constituted a continuing "actionable viola-
tion" giving rise to a postpetition unfair labor practice.' 22
In Greyhound, following unsuccessful negotiations for a successor
collective bargaining agreement and the expiration of the parties'
existing contract, employees of Greyhound went on strike. The NLRB
filed a complaint against Greyhound alleging an unfair labor practice
following Greyhound's unilateral implementation of certain terms of its
final, pre-contract expiration proposal. Shortly thereafter, Greyhound
and several affiliates filed petitions under chapter 11.123
The district court refused to expand the administrative expense pri-
ority to constructive wages, finding such a holding required the court to
ignore the requirement that the expense be for actual and necessary
wages.' 24 The court also found that the estate received no benefit, thus,
precluding administrative priority.' 25  The court did not distinguish
Reading's reasoning that in some cases fairness dictates the granting of
administrative priority. 126 Finally, because the alleged unfair labor prac-
tice occurred pre-petition, the court opined that the "mere fact" that the
alleged damages arose postpetition did not alter the character of the
claim. 127
In another back pay case stemming from a pre-petition employment
relationship which ceased prior to the chapter 7 bankruptcy filing, the
bankruptcy court found that the claim for back pay accruing postpetition
was not entitled to administrative priority where the estate received no
postpetition benefit and did not damage the employees. 28 In the case of
In re Sher-Del Foods, Inc., the NLRB contended that the debtor's failure
to negotiate postpetition elevated the back pay award to an expense of
administration. 29 In rejecting the NLRB's position, the court found that
the back pay award was "prepetition in character."' 3 °
Although In re Continental Airlines is a district court decision, the
District Court of Delaware is especially influential in bankruptcy cases.
That district attracts an inordinate number of cases because of its reputa-
tion for expeditiously handling cases and the favorable treatment
121. Id. at 433.
122. Id. The NLRB subsequently conceded that the failure to reinstate did not authorize the
filing of an unfair labor practice charge.
123. Id. at 422.
124. Id. at 435.
125. Id.
126. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
127. Id. at 433-34.
128. In re Sher-Del Foods, Inc., 186 B.R. 358 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995).
129. Id. at 362.
130. Id.
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afforded corporations under the Delaware corporate statutes. 13' In re
Continental Airlines correctly rules that administrative expense priority
status is precluded for back pay, front pay, or compensatory damages
accruing postpetition from a pre-petition violation where these damage
claims are in the nature of "wages" because the services for being com-
pensated were not "rendered" to the debtor-in-possession.1 32 Treating
back pay as wages under section 503(b)(1)(A) is absurd because the ter-
minated employee is unable to render services to the debtor-in-posses-
sion because he is no longer employed by the debtor-in-possession. 133
The decisions in the cases of In re Continental Airlines and In re
Eagle Business Manufacturing ignore the Supreme Court's mandate in
Reading, which states that fairness dictates that persons injured by acts
of a debtor-in-possession or bankruptcy trustee are entitled to adminis-
trative expense priority. There is no requirement that the debtor receive
a benefit-only that the claimant have suffered an injury at the hands of
an insolvent debtor. The Court instructed that in discrimination cases,
reinstatement of the injured employee brings the employer into "'volun-
tary compliance' . . . ending discrimination."' 34 The In re Continental
Airlines and Eagle Business Manufacturing courts mistakenly analogize
the postpetition accrual of back pay to the commission of a postpetition
tort, admonishing that similar to a tort, the discriminatory act must occur
postpetition for administrative expense priority to inure to the claimant.
This conclusory analysis ignores the unique damages available in
employment discrimination cases and the unilateral power of the
employer to end the discrimination. In Reading, no act of the trustee
could reverse the fire damage suffered by the petitioner. Conversely, in
employment discrimination cases it is within the employer's power to
stop the accrual of damages by voluntarily ending its discriminatory
conduct through reinstatement. The equitable relief in the form of back
pay and front pay accrues each day only because the employer wrong-
fully fails to reinstate the claimant.
131. Many corporations are able to seek bankruptcy relief in the District of Delaware by taking
advantage of the venue provision permitting a debtor to file in its place of incorporation. See 28
U.S.C. § 1408 (1994).
132. Pursuant to the doctrine of expresio unius est exclusio alterius, the inclusion of the word
"rendered" in both sections 503(b)(1)(A) and 507(a)(4)(A) and its exclusion in section
507(a)(3)(A) demonstrates the drafters' intent that services must be rendered as a condition to
"wages" in order to be allowed as an administrative expense pursuant to section 503. See
generally United States v. Miami Univ., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (S.D. Ohio 2000).
133. In chapter 11 cases involving pre-petition discriminatory conduct, the claimant was never
employed by the debtor-in-possession because he was terminated pre-petition, before the creation
of a debtor-in-possession. In chapter 7, cases, the cessation of the debtor's business precludes the
employee from rendering the requisite service.
134. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 229 (1982).
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In re Continental Airline's logic that administrative status in Read-
ing and In re Charlesbank Laundry was permissible because in both of
those cases the claimants were injured by the debtors' continued opera-
tions actually supports granting administrative priority for back pay
accruing postpetition in employment discrimination cases. It is the con-
tinued operation of the business, without the reinstatement of the claim-
ant, which causes the postpetition injuries - but for the debtor's failure
to reinstate and voluntarily end the unlawful discrimination, the claimant
would have a job. 135
In re Charlesbank Laundry further supports the granting of admin-
istrative expense priority. In that decision, the First Circuit reasoned
that administrative expense priority for attorneys fees accruing postpeti-
tion was warranted under Reading's fairness rationale because the
claimants' lives were "adversely affected" by the debtor's continued
operation in violation of the pre-petition injunction. 136 Back pay accru-
ing postpetition should be entitled to administrative priority because the
lives of the victims of the discrimination were adversely affected by the
debtor's continued failure to offer reinstatement.
Alleviating debtor-in-possessions and operating trustees from the
incentive of "voluntary compliance" by relegating back pay accruing
postpetition in employment discrimination cases to pre-petition
unsecured status hoists a debtor-in-possession upon unsuspecting dis-
criminatees. This thereby guts Title VII's goal of eliminating discrimi-
nation in the workplace through voluntary compliance. Absolving the
employer of its obligation to issue back pay accruing post-petition as an
administrative expense undermines the anti-discrimination laws. It does
so by providing employers an incentive not to reinstate discrimination
victims, but rather to usurp discriminatees to the ranks of the general
unsecured creditors whom may ultimately obtain only a small fraction of
the value of their claims. 13
7
135. Administrative expense priority should not be allowed where the business is closed
because the debtor-in-possession no longer has the power to reinstate the claimant.
136. In re Charlesbank Laundry, Inc., 755 F.2d 200, 202 (lst Cir. 1985).
137. The unfair labor practice and WARN cases are distinguishable as follows: (i) none of
those cases involved Title VII claims; (ii) the Supreme Court's decision in Ford Motor Company,
finding that employment discrimination continues each day the employer fails to reinstate and
voluntarily end the discrimination, mandates treating back pay accruing postpetition in
discrimination cases as an administrative expense; (iii) In re Sher-Del Foods did not involve an
operating debtor making reinstatement impossible; and (iv) In re Eagle Business Manufacturing's
holding that a benefit must ensue to the debtor to award administrative expense priority is at odds
with Reading's holding that administrative costs include expenses incident to the debtor's
operation, not only costs without which rehabilitation would not be possible. Also, on appeal the
NLRB in the case of In re Eagle Business Manufacturing argued that the date on which the wages
accrued was at issue, not the date on which Greyhound refused to reinstate (abandoning the
argument that failure to reinstate constitutes an ongoing unfair labor practice).
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Damages stemming from pre-petition acts ordinarily not entitled to
administrative expense priority may still be entitled to priority as pre-
petition wages. Otherwise, these claims will be deemed unsecured,
receiving payment only after the priority claims are paid in full.
C. Priority Status for Damages Accruing Pre-Petition
Back pay, front pay, and damages stemming from pre-petition acts
may be eligible for priority as wages in amounts up to $4,650, pursuant
to section 507(a)(3) of the Code. 138  The Code requires that these
"wages" are earned within ninety days of the date the petition was filed
or the date of the cessation of the debtor's business.1 39 Because the pre-
petition wage priority status is capped at $4,650, this relief may be
inconsequential since the remaining portion of the award will be deemed
unsecured.
The priority claim for unsecured pre-petition wages pursuant to
section 507 is distinct from the "wage" claim allowed as an expense of
administration pursuant to section 503. Section 507 concerns pre-peti-
tion wages and grants a priority in the capped amount for wages
"earned" during the ninety days prior to the filing of the bankruptcy
case. 140 In contrast, section 503 concerns postpetition wages and grants
administrative expense status to claims arising postpetition in favor of a
claimant "for services rendered" to the debtor-in-possession or
trustee. 14"'
While a few cases discuss administrative priority for wage claims
stemming from an employer's statutory and tort liability, even fewer
address wage claim priority for these claims. For example, In re Conti-
nental Airlines and In re Palau are inapplicable to pre-petition,
unsecured, priority wage claims since the issues in these cases were
whether the claims were entitled to administrative expense priority
under section 503(b)(1)(A) of the Code (governing wages earned
postpetition), not whether the claims were entitled to wage priority
under section 507(a)(3) of the Code (governing wages earned pre-peti-
tion). Decisions concerning claims arising from pre-petition unfair labor
practices and WARN violations provide the most fertile ground for
growth of understanding the wage claim priority. 142
138. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1994). See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. The
priority for unsecured pre-petition wages is capped at $4,650 because employees are likely to quit
after a few weeks if they are not being paid. The cap also act to protect middle income wage
earners, not highly compensated employees.
139. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1994).
140. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3)(A) (1994).
141. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1994).
142. See, e.g., In re Cargo Inc., 138 B.R. 923 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1992); In re Riker Indus.,
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Back pay awards stemming from a pre-petition unfair labor practice
are not entitled to different treatment compared to any other wage
claims.I43 In Nathanson, the NLRB unsuccessfully argued that its claim
for back pay as an agent for employees who were "discriminated
against" by their employer was entitled to priority as a debt owing to the
United States pursuant to section 64 of the Act. 144 The Court found that
Congress never intended to grant priority for all unpaid wages; rather it
provided that back pay be allowed as a priority only if earned within
three months before the filing and in the maximum sum of $600. "1
Another wage priority case, even more closely analogous to those
involving claims for back pay resulting from employment discrimina-
tion, involves a claim resulting from violation of a collective bargaining
agreement. In the case of In re N & TAssociation, 146 without significant
discussion the district court concluded that a portion of a back pay award
stemming from the debtor's violation of a collective bargaining agree-
ment more than one year prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy
case was entitled to priority. 14  The court limited the priority claim to
the "wages accruing" during the ninety days before the filing of the peti-
tion. 48 The court declined to address whether the wages would be enti-
tled to administrative expense status since none of the wages accrued
post-petition. 149
The bankruptcy court allowed wage priority for WARN 5 ° claims
in the case of In re Cargo.'5' These claims arose approximately six
weeks before the debtor filed for bankruptcy relief pursuant to chapter 7,
as a result of a plant closing effected without providing the required
statutory notice. The trustee asserted that wages awarded under WARN
are statutory penalties (not wages earned within ninety days of the com-
mencement of the case) and are intended to punish employers. The trus-
tee contended that the WARN statutory scheme did not require that
Inc., 151 B.R. 823 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993); In re N & T Assoc., Inc., 78 B.R. 285 (Bankr. D.
Nev. 1987).
143. Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 29 (1952).
144. Id. at 27. The nature of the unfair labor practice is not described in the Supreme Court or
lower court decisions. See Nathanson v. NLRB, 194 F.2d 248 (1st Cir. 1952); In re Mackenzie
Coach Lines, 100 F. Supp. 489 (D. Mass. 1951).
145. Id. at 29.
146. 78 B.R. 285 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1987).
147. The nature of the violation is not discussed in the opinion.
148. In re N & T Assoc. Inc., 78 B.R. at 288.
149. Id. See In re Sher-Del Foods, Inc., 186 B.R. 358, 362 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995)
(concluding that back pay stemming from a pre-petition unfair labor practice and accruing during
the ninety days proceeding the bankruptcy filing was entitled to wage priority subject to the
applicable dollar amounts).
150. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(1) (1994).
151. 138 B.R. 923 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1992).
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wages earned from employment obtained after the plant lay-off be
deducted from the WARN damages to demonstrate the statute's penal
nature, and that these WARN damages were separate and distinct from
wages payable under ordinary circumstances. 15 2 Rejecting this conten-
tion, the court analogized claims for pre-petition WARN violations to
severance pay claims representing payment in lieu of notice, which are
deemed earned upon termination and entitled to priority. Therefore, in
the court's view, WARN damages were remedial, not punitive., 53 The
court refused to find that the employees must have been employed con-
tinuously during the statutory ninety day period. 154 The court noted that
a contrary ruling would permit employers to close plants without notice,
wait ninety days, and then file bankruptcy, thereby precluding employ-
ers from obtaining wage priority status for the damages incurred by the
employer's WARN violation.155
In the case of In re Riker Industries, the court extended priority
wage status to injuries of employees from pre-petition WARN viola-
tions. The debtor's liability stemmed from the debtor's cessation of bus-
iness without the requisite WARN notice one week prior to the filing of
an involuntary petition against the debtor.'56 The chapter 7 involuntary
petition was filed on April 27, 1990. The debtor consented to an order
for relief on May 7, 1990.157 Relying on the rationale of In re Cargo,
and reasoning that WARN is intended to provide employees an opportu-
nity to adjust to the loss of employment, the court granted wage priority
status to the employees. 158
There is no basis for distinguishing pre-petition back pay awards
arising from pre-petition contractual and WARN violations from pre-
petition back pay arising from pre-petition employment discrimination.
Back pay awards arising from pre-petition employment discrimination
should receive priority as a pre-petition wage claim. The timing of the
violation is irrelevant because the employer's back pay liability contin-
ues accruing during the ninety day period absent an offer of uncondi-
tional reinstatement.' 59 Thus, where the termination occurs prior to the
ninety days preceding the filing, and by analogizing Title VII back pay
awards to WARN and severance claims, one must conclude that back
pay accruing during the ninety days before the filing should likewise be
152. Id. at 923.
153. Id. at 927. See supra discussion concerning severance pay at Part III.A.
154. This period has since been amended to 180 days. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1994).
155. In re Cargo Inc., 138 B.R. at 928.
156. In re Riker Indus., Inc. 151 B.R. 823, 826-27 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993).
157. The debtor's operations ceased on April 20, 1990. Id. at 824.
158. Id. at 827.
159. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 232 (1982). See supra note 97.
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given wage claim priority. But, in cases where the employee is offered
reinstatement during the ninety day period, the back pay ceases to accrue
and priority status should only be allowed for back pay accrued within
the ninety days and prior to the offer of reinstatement. Finally, back pay
accruing prior to the ninety day period is not subject to any priority
treatment under the Code. Front pay is indistinguishable from back pay
and should be granted pre-petition wage priority status in the same
manner.
Questions of the priority of an employment discrimination claim
become meaningful only after the claim is liquidated and "allowed" in a
bankruptcy case. Often, a debtor will file bankruptcy prior to the liqui-
dation of a pre-petition discrimination claim. 60 Unless the parties agree
to allowance of the claim, the parties cannot determine what portion of
the claim, if any, is entitled to pre-petition wage priority. 16' Because the
automatic stay bars the creditor's continuation of his discrimination
action against the debtor, stay relief must be sought in the bankruptcy
case. 1
6 2
IV. STAY RELIEF TO LIQUIDATE EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
The automatic stay bars, inter alia, the commencement or continua-
tion of any judicial or administrative actions against the debtor. 163 This
statutory bar stays private plaintiffs from commencing, or continuing
lawsuits or collection efforts against the debtor. Accordingly, private
160. Except in chapter 7 cases with no assets (where the creditors will not receive any
distribution in the liquidation), claims must be liquidated enabling a pro-rata distribution to the
creditors. Under Chapter 11 (unless the claim is estimated), liquidation is essential since the
dollar amount of claims are used in determining if a class of claimants has accepted the plan. II
U.S.C. § 1126 (1994).
161. A settlement as to the allowance of a claim requires court approval. FED. R. BANKR. P.
9019. See Jeffrey v. Desmond, 70 F.3d 183 (Ist Cir. 1995) (explaining that when determining
whether to approve settlement of an employment discrimination claim the bankruptcy court
considers: (i) the probability of success in the litigation; (ii) the difficulties, if any, to be
encountered in collection; (iii) the complexity, expense, inconvenience, and delay attendant to the
litigation; and (iv) the interest of the creditors and a proper deference to their reasonable views)
(citations omitted).
162. Often, stay relief will be sought only after the debtor has filed an objection to the
creditor's proof of claim since the claim is deemed allowed until an objection is lodged. II
U.S.C. § 502(a) (1994).
163. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. V. 1999). The automatic stay does not operate to
stay the commencement or continuation of proceedings by governmental units to enforce such
unit's police or regulatory power or to enforce nonmonetary judgments. II U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)
(1994 & Supp. V. 1999). The stay is inapplicable to proceedings by the EEOC and state human
rights commissions because of their status as governmental units with police and regulatory
powers. See supra note 27.
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claimants must seek to stay relief before continuing to prosecute dis-
crimination claims.
Relief from the automatic stay may be obtained by showing
"cause."' 6 Although the term is not defined in the Code, case law
establishes that cause includes the bankruptcy court's lack of jurisdiction
to determine a matter. 65 Bankruptcy courts lack jurisdiction to decide
"personal injury tort claims."' 66 The courts are split on the question of
which claims actually constitute "personal injury tort claims," and only
some employment discrimination claims are deemed to fall within the
exception. Notwithstanding the court's lack of jurisdiction to decide
these claims, the automatic stay still applies. 67 In cases where a dis-
crimination claimant is seeking stay relief for "cause," the underlying
issue may be whether the claim constitutes a personal injury tort claim.
Some courts apply a broad definition of "personal injury tort." The
broad approach defines "personal injury tort" as private or civil wrongs
for which damages are recoverable. This includes damage to an individ-
ual's person and invasions of personal rights, such as mental suffer-
ing.168 Other courts assume a narrow approach that requires either a
physical, mental, or emotional trauma or a bodily injury.' 69 The narrow
approach includes mental distress claims without bodily injury where
the claim is the gravamen of the complaint. 170
In the case of In re Thomas, creditors filed three separate motions
seeking relief from the automatic stay to continue separate state court
164. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1994 & Supp. V. 1999).
165. In re Thomas, 211 B.R. 838 (Bankr. D. S.C. 1997).
166. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (1994). The Code provides that personal injury tort claims shall be
tried in the district court in the jurisdiction where the claims arose or where the case is pending, as
determined by the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending. Id. In conjunction with
the overhaul of the Code triggered by the Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (finding that the expanded
jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts contained in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was
unconstitutional), the Code was amended by the Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 to remove
personal injury tort claims from the grasp of the bankruptcy courts. Where the estimation of a
personal injury tort claim is necessary for plan confirmation, the bankruptcy court may preside
over the estimation. II U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) (1994). Determinations for purposes of
distribution, however, must be made by the district court. Id.
167. It U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994 & Supp. V. 1999).
168. See In re Thomas, 211 B.R. at 840-41 (quoting In re Boyer, 93 B.R. 313, 317 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1988)).
169. In re Cohen, 107 B.R. 453, 455 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989). The narrow approach is often
criticized since the federal statutory exemptions include certain payments "on account of personal
bodily injury." This demonstrates that Congress never intended to require bodily injury and knew
how to similarly limit the personal injury exception. In re Vinci, 108 B.R. 439, 442 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1989) (debtor's § 1983 civil rights claim did not fall within the personal injury tort
exception because it did not involve a trauma or bodily injury). See discussion regarding
exemptions infra at Part VI.
170. Bertholet v. Harman, 126 B.R. 413, 416 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1991).
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actions. All of these actions involved intentional infliction of emotional
distress. In one case, the causes of action associated with the intentional
infliction of emotional distress allegedly arose as a result of acts of sex-
ual harassment and offensive touching by the debtor."'7 After determin-
ing that the complaint fit within the broad and narrow definitions of
"personal injury tort" (because both definitions include intentional
infliction of emotional distress as a personal injury tort), the bankruptcy
court found that it lacked jurisdiction and granted stay relief for cause. 72
In contrast, two more recent decisions adopt a narrow view of "per-
sonal injury tort" in employment discrimination cases. In the case of In
re Interco, Inc.,173 the court applied the narrow interpretation of "per-
sonal injury tort," finding it could maintain jurisdiction to decide a fed-
eral age discrimination suit. In the court's view, where a mental distress
claim does not involve physical injury, the claim for mental distress
must be the gravamen of the complaint.' 74
Likewise, the bankruptcy court in In re Cohen held a tort claim for
a statutory violation of a New York State anti-discrimination law did not
fall within the personal injury tort exception.' 75 The court, relying on
legislative history, construed the statute narrowly and held that the claim
was "not a claim for a 'personal injury tort' in the traditional, plain-
meaning sense of those words."' 76 The court distinguished employment
discrimination claims from injuries resulting from "a slip and fall" or a
psychiatric impairment beyond mere shame and humiliation. 177 A "tort
without trauma" could not fall within the statutory exception. 178
Lack of jurisdiction is not the only "cause" for lifting the automatic
stay, thereby allowing employment discrimination claimants to proceed.
In one case, public policy considerations supported lifting the automatic
171. In re Thomas, 211 B.R. at 840.
172. Id. at 842. But see In re Vinci, 108 B.R. at 439.
173. Priest v. Interco, Inc. (In re Interco, Inc.), 135 B.R. 359, 362 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991).
174. Id. (citing Bertholet, 126 B.R. at 416) (explaining that jurisdiction would too easily be lost
if a mental distress claim not involving physical injury is not the gravamen of the complaint). The
In re Interco, Inc. court relied on In re Vinci for the proposition that a tort requires a trauma or
bodily injury to fall within the statutory exception for a personal injury claim. Id.
175. In re Cohen, 107 B.R. 453, 455 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. (citations omitted). The court also reasoned that the present case was directly related
to the plaintiff's unliquidated damage claim in the bankruptcy case because the court needed to
determine liability and damages, and resolve the issue of whether the alleged tortious conduct was
willful and malicious. Finding that judicial efficiency and fairness would be served if the entire
controversy as to liability, damages and dischargeability were adjudicated in one proceeding, the
court determined it should be that "officer." Id. Yet, the court could have opted to grant stay relief
for a determination of liability and damages, and, thereafter held a trial as to the possibility of
discharge.
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stay to permit a harassment case to continue since the bankruptcy estate
would not incur great prejudice and the hardships tipped in favor, of the
creditor.' 79  Prior to the debitor's bankruptcy petition, the creditor
alleged several incidents of harassment and she sought stay relief to pur-
sue her action in the district court.' 80 The court granted stay relief, not-
ing the "strong public policy" of resolving sexual harassment claims
without undue delay.' 8' These grounds, however, are far less certain
than the traditional lack of jurisdiction.
The ability to obtain stay relief to prosecute an employment dis-
crimination claim depends largely on whether the court adopts the nar-
row or broad approach when defining personal injury tort. Clearly,
under the broad approach, employment discrimination claims will be
covered as they constitute private or civil wrongs for which damages are
recoverable. If the court adopts a narrow approach, discrimination
claims that do not involve bodily injury or trauma may not be covered
unless the gravamen of the complaint is a mental distress claim.'
82
Many creditors object to having their claims determined in a bank-
ruptcy court because they fear that damage awards will be undervalued
to assure that funds are available for a meaningful distribution to all
creditors. Others fear that their claims will be prejudiced by bankruptcy
judges who may lack experience in handling discrimination cases. Dis-
crimination plaintiffs should always contemplate an employer's bank-
ruptcy filing and make strategic decisions at the pleading stage in an
effort to protect their forum selection and to avoid what may be per-
ceived as an inevitable, unjust outcome. This can be accomplished by
taking steps during the pleading stage to assure that the claim will fall
within the personal injury exception (e.g., making a mental distress
claim the gravamen of the complaint). 83
V. ALTERNATIVES TO STAY RELIEF
Plaintiffs desiring to pursue their discrimination claims outside the
bankruptcy court may not be limited to seeking stay relief. Creditors
may also request that the court abstain from hearing the action if state
179. In re Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 148 B.R. 920 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1993).
180. Id. at 922.
181. Id. at 924.
182. Relying on In re America West Airlines, Inc., a discrimination claimant could attempt to
convince the court that public policy exists to support the granting of stay relief.
183. The plaintiffs forum selection may not be protected in the employer's subsequent
bankruptcy if the claim is considered a personal injury tort and prompts the district court where
the bankruptcy case is pending to determine where the discrimination case should be tried. See
supra note 152. Employment discrimination claims filed both pre-petition and postpetition are
subject to removal to the district court where the civil action is pending if the district court has
jurisdiction of such claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1452 (1994).
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law claims are involved.'84 Also, the district court may withdraw the
reference for cause shown and thereby assume jurisdiction of the
claim. 85 The propriety of combining a motion to abstain and/or with-
draw the reference with a motion for stay relief should be considered
when the claimant desires to preserve his forum selection.
Often after liquidating a pre-petition claim, the discriminatee finds
most of his claim will be discharged in the employer's bankruptcy case.
In some instances, these claims will be excepted from the debtor's
discharge.
VI. EXCEPTING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS FROM THE
DEBTOR'S DISCHARGE
After a creditor's discrimination claim is liquidated, he may find
that only a small portion of his claim, if any, is entitled to priority status.
Thus, that creditor has been relegated to unsecured status with little
prospect for a meaningful distribution. When the claim is against an
individual in bankruptcy, such as an individual employer or supervisor,
the creditor may succeed in having the claim excepted from the debtor's
discharge. This thereby enables the creditor to pursue the debtor after
the discharge is granted.
Since the exceptions to possibility of discharge only apply to indi-
vidual debtors, the issue of whether to except an employment discrimi-
nation claim from discharge arises only in caSes involving a debtor who
is an individual employer or where the debtor is held personally liable to
the plaintiff. Although a majority of circuits, including the Second Cir-
cuit, have held that supervisors are not "employers" within the meaning
of Title VII and, therefore, are not subject to individual liability under
Title VII, 186 complainants may still recover judgments against these
184. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c) (1994). If the claim is filed in a state court, the federal bankruptcy
court, in its discretion, may abstain from hearing the case in the interests of comity. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(c)(1) (1994). The mandatory abstention rules contained in section 1334(c)(2), providing
for abstention where the action could not have been commenced in a federal court absent the
bankruptcy and the case can be timely adjudicated in state court, are inapplicable to personal
injury tort claims however. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(c)(2), 157(b)(4) (1994).
185. A motion to withdraw the reference requests that the district court refrain from referring
the matter to the bankruptcy court pursuant to its standing order of referral. The motion, directed
to the district court, requests that it hear the bankruptcy case. 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (1994). See In
re Orion Pictures Corp., 4 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir. 1993). The district court shall withdraw the
reference if the court determines that resolution of the proceeding requires consideration of both
Title II and other laws of the United States regulating organizations or activities affecting
commerce. 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (1994).
186. See Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295
(2d Cir. 1995); Sheridan v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061 (3d Cir. 1996); Lissau
v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 1998); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649 (5th Cir.
1994); Wathen v. Gen. Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 1997); EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations,
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individuals under state anti-discrimination laws and tort theories.
In an effort to protect creditors injured from a debtor's willful and
malicious conduct and to preclude debtors from avoiding liability for
their willful acts by filing for bankruptcy relief, the Code contains a
specific discharge exception for these claims. The Code provides that
the discharge of an individual debtor does not discharge debts "for will-
ful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property
of another entity."' 87  Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Kawaauhau v. Geiger,8 ' bankruptcy courts generally excepted sexual
harassment claims from discharge pursuant to section 523(a)(6) of the
Code, notwithstanding that the circuit courts of appeals were split on the
meaning of both the "willful" and "malicious" prongs.' 89 The Geiger
court fully resolved the dispute among the circuits of whether "willful"
required a showing of actual intent to cause injury, or, deliberate acts
that cause injury by holding that a debtor must intend to cause the injury
resulting from his misconduct.'9 ° The Court left unresolved, however,
the issue of whether the creditor must still establish malice, and if so,
whether "special malice," "implied malice," or "no just cause or
excuse" is required to be established under section 523.
The petitioner in Geiger, a patient of the debtor, Dr. Paul Geiger,
Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995); Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., 55 F.3d 1276 (8th Cir. 1995);
Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993); Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898
(10th Cir. 1996); Cross v. Alabama State Dept. of Mental Health Retardation, 49 F.3d 1490 (11th
Cir. 1995). In the Fourth Circuit, supervisors may be individually liable in Title VII cases where
they wield significant control over the plaintiff and their conduct cannot be categorized as a
plainly delegable duty. Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989), rev'd in part, aff'd
in relevant part, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990). The First Circuit has not ruled on individual
liability. See Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l Inc., 229 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2000); Barbosa v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., No. Civ. 00-1546(HL), 2000 WL 1739309, at *1 (D. P.R. Nov. 15, 2000).
187. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2000) (emphasis added).
188. 523 U.S. 57 (1998).
189. The majority of the reported decisions construing the dischargeability of employment
discrimination claims concern sexual harassment claims. See In re Liccio, Nos. Civ. A 96-624,
Civ. A 96-8167, 1997 WL 158197, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 1997) (holding that claim
based on sexual harassment stemming from offensive touching and unwelcome comments was
nondischargeable under willful and malicious exception to discharge); In re Wilson, 216 B.R. 258
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1997) (holding that claim based on employee's loss of employment because she
resisted debtor/employer's sexual advances was nondischargeable under section 523[a][6]); In re
Sotelo, 179 B.R. 214 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1995) (hostile environment sexual harassment claim
nondischargeable). See also In re Gee, 173 B.R. 189 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) (debt based on sex
discrimination was nondischargeable because it arose from willful and malicious misconduct); In
re Miera, 926 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that male employee established judgment
stemming from battery in the form of a kiss was willful and malicious and nondischargeable). Cf
In re Harris, No. 94 C 7496, 1995 WL 476676 (N.D I11. Aug. 7, 1995) (explaining that since
creditor failed to prove that debtor acted with the requisite willfulness and malice, excepting
creditor's sexual harassment claim from discharge was precluded).
190. Geiger, 523 U.S. at 61.
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sought treatment for a foot injury. 91 The debtor admitted the petitioner
to the hospital and prescribed oral penicillin, notwithstanding that he
knew intravenous penicillin was more effective. 192 The petitioner was
then left in the care of other physicians when the debtor departed on a
business trip.' 93 These other doctors transferred her to an infectious dis-
ease specialist.194 Upon his return, the debtor canceled the transfer and
discontinued all antibiotics because he mistakenly believed that the
infection had subsided. 195 The petitioner's right leg was amputated
below the knee after her condition deteriorated. 96
A jury awarded the petitioner and her husband damages in the
approximate sum of $335,000.'9' The debtor carried no malpractice
insurance and moved to another state where his wages were gar-
nished. 98 Thereafter, the debtor filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy
court found the debtor's treatment was willful and malicious because it
fell far below the appropriate standard of care.' 99 The Eighth Circuit, en
banc, found that the exception to dischargeability for willful and mali-
cious injury requires an intentional tort, rather than negligent or reckless
misconduct.20° The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split
among the circuits of whether the dischargeability exception covers acts
done intentionally which cause injury, or only acts done with the actual
intent of causing injury.2 1
Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court, held that section
523 requires a showing of a deliberate and intentional injury and "not
merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury. 20 2 Negligent
or reckless conduct is insufficient to support nondischargeability.
Because the debtor's conduct in prescribing the petitioner's treatment
was negligent, as opposed to an intentional act by the debtor to cause the
amputation of the petitioners' leg, the claim was dischargeable.20 3
While the Court framed the issue in Gieger as dealing with the
scope of the "willful and malicious injury" exception, only the meaning
of the word "willful" as a modifier to "injury" is addressed in the ensu-
191. Id. at 59.
192. The debtor testified that he understood the patient desired to minimize her treatment costs.
Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 59-60.
199. Id. at 60.
200. Geiger v. Kawaauhau, 113 F.3d 848 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
201. Geiger, 523 U.S. at 60-61.
202. Id. at 61.
203. See id. at 61-64.
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ing discussion.2 4 Because the Court never explicitly states whether its
holding applies to only the "willful" requirement or both the "willful
and malicious" prongs, however, confusion has arisen amongst the
bankruptcy courts concerning the necessity of fulfilling the malice
requirement. Although the majority of the subsequent decisions inter-
pret Geiger as resolving only the meaning of "willful," the Supreme
Court's phrasing of the issue in broad terms inclusive of the malice ele-
ment has caused some courts to question whether both the willful and
malicious requirement were examined in Geiger.°5
A. The Collapse of the Malice Prong
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals became the first circuit to
address whether Geiger collapsed the willful and malicious prongs into
one when it concluded in Miller v. J.D. Abrams, Inc. that, in light of
Geiger, the "willful and malicious" prongs were now a "unitary con-
cept. '20 6 The court reversed the bankruptcy court's grant of summary
judgment excepting from discharge a state court judgment for $1 million
which was based on a jury verdict finding the debtor had misappropri-
ated his former employer's proprietary information and misused its trade
secrets. 207 The court reasoned that what is required to establish "implied
malice," is a showing that the act is done intentionally and deliberately
in knowing disregard of another's rights (a showing "quite close" to
Geiger's standard for willful injury). Otherwise, a "special malice"
204. Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
205. Salem Bend Condo. Ass'n v. Bullock-Williams (In re Bullock-Williams), 220 B.R. 345
(B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998) (does not specifically address malice requirement except for indicating that
its prior decisions interpreting malice as being wrongful, without just cause, or excessive were
overruled by Geiger); Aldus Green Co. v. Mitchell (In re Mitchell), 227 B.R. 45, 51 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1998) (applies Geiger standard to willfulness prong and pre-Geiger law interpreting the
malice as without just cause or excuse, even in the absence of personal hatred); Mega Ent., Inc. v.
Lahiri (In re Lahiri), 225 B.R. 582, 586-87 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) (applies malice standard of
without just cause or excuse even in the absence of personal hatred, spite, or ill will); Reilly v.
Beeman (In re Beeman), 225 B.R. 522, 528 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1998) (discusses both prongs); Estate
of Hamilton v. Nolan (In re Nolan), 220 B.R. 727, 730 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1998) (applies separate
malice standard of "in conscious disregard of one's duties or without just cause or excuse"); Avco
Fin. Serv. of Billings v. Kidd (In re Kidd), 219 B.R. 278, 283-85 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1998)
(relying on Geiger limits inquiry to whether intentional tort was committed); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Dzuik (In re Dziuk), 218 B.R. 485 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1998) (requires showing of willfulness and
malice standard of "targeted act").
206. Miller v. J.D. Abrams, Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598, 606 (5th Cir. 1998). See Baldwin
v. Kilpatrick (In re Baldwin), 245 B.R. 131 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000) (following Miller's approach of
making willfulness and malicious a unitary concept); Spokane Ry. Credit Union v. Endicott (In re
Endicott), 254 B.R. 471 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2000) (Ninth Circuit does not expressly require or
prohibit a separate inquiry into or proof of malice). See also In re Hunter, 229 B.R. 851, 860
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999) (relies on Geiger for interpretation of "maliciousness"); In re LaGrone,
230 B.R. 900 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1999).
207. In re Miller, 156 F.3d at 601.
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standard that would require a motive to harm would make nondis-
chargeability unduly rare. Thus, the approach of requiring a showing of
no just cause or excuse was "displaced" by Geiger.20 8 Both the willful
and malice elements under Miller now require proof of a deliberate and
intentional injury.
The day after the Miller decision, a bankruptcy court in Maine rec-
ognized the "temptation" of collapsing the willful and malice require-
ments but refused to render the malice requirement meaningless.20 9 In
Slosberg, the claimant sought to except from the debtor's discharge
damages awarded after a jury trial following a default imposed as a dis-
covery sanction.2" The claimant contended that the bankruptcy court
was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues of willful and mali-
cious. The underlying claims stemmed from the debtor/attorney's mal-
practice.211 The bankruptcy court adopted the standard of malice
specifically rejected by Miller, the showing of no just cause or excuse,
and found that the default did not establish that the debtor acted willfully
or with the requisite malice since the complaint contained alternative
claims and included allegations of negligence.2" 2
In an effort to give meaning to the malicious requirement, bank-
ruptcy courts in the Eighth Circuit are clinging to pre-Geiger decisions
interpreting malice as involving situations where the debtor targets the
creditor to suffer the "harm" resulting from the debtor's tortious act, as
opposed to the creditor's "injury."2 3 It is unclear, however, how to dis-
tinguish between "targeting the creditor to suffer harm" and Geiger's
requirement that the debtor "intend" the consequences of his act, to wit,
the harm.
In Thompson v. Kelly (In re Kelly),2" 4 a post-Geiger decision, the
208. Id. at 605. The court rejected the definition of implied malice requiring no bad motive on
the part of the debtor. Id. Yet, the court's definition of implied malice still requires a lesser
showing (only deliberate intent to commit the act not to cause the injury), than necessary under
Geiger to establish wilfulness.
209. McAlister v. Slosberg (In re Slosberg), 225 B.R. 9, 20 (Bankr. D. Me. 1998).
210. Id. at 16.
211. The damage trial was held following the court's defaulting the debtor as a discovery
sanction. Id. at 12.
212. Id. at 22.
213. Fischer v. Scarborough (In re Scarborough), 171 F.3d 638 (8th Cir. 1999) (former
husband sought to except from discharge judgment against former wife based on malicious
prosecution and abuse of process; collateral estoppel applied, because the jury determined the
issues of willfulness and malice under instructions which met the Geiger standards for willful and
malicious conduct intended to harm the creditor); Hobson Mould Works v. Madsen (In re
Madsen), 195 F.3d 988, 989 (8th Cir. 1999) (adopting targeting at the creditor test for malice)
(relying on the pre-Geiger decision of In re Long, 774 F.2d at 875).
214. 238 B.R. 156 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1999). Details of the underlying factual allegations
concerning the nature of the harassment are omitted from the decision.
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court found malice under the "targeting the creditor" standard where the
debtor/employer sexually harassed his employee. The court determined
that the debtor knew or should have known that his sexual "intentional
tort" would cause the harm.2 5 Although the court's rationale that the
intentional act of harassment was sufficient to show malice supported
the view that the concept of "targeting the harm" and "intending the
consequence of the act" are equivalent concepts, the court, relying on
pre-Geiger decisions, proceeded through the machination of analyzing
the malice requirement.21 6
In another post-Geiger decision involving a sexual harassment
claim, the court determined that the plaintiffs hostile environment, sex-
ual harassment damage award was nondischargeable. 217 The court in
the case of In re Martino relied on the state court's findings of "willful
indifference" to conclude that the debtor's conduct was both willful and
malicious.2t 8 It is not clear whether the court considered the require-
ments of willful and malicious separately, but it appears the court con-
sidered the elements in concert.
Some bankruptcy courts, relying on decisions that predate Geiger,
continue to interpret malice as meaning wrongful and without just cause
or excuse, even in the absence of personal hatred, spite, or ill will.
2
,
9
In the case of In re Howcraft, the court interpreted Geiger as quali-
fying malicious to require a traditional intentional tort, the exact mean-
ing the court in Geiger assigned to the willful prong. 2 0 The creditor in
In re Hawcroft sought to except from the debtor's discharge damages
stemming from a civil claim for assault and intentional infliction of
emotional distress filed following the debtor's conviction on charges of
assault and aggravated felonious sexual assault.22' Interestingly, the
debtor acknowledged his conduct was willful under Geiger, yet the court
still addressed whether his conduct was malicious.
215. Id. at 161.
216. Id. Although the court cites the post-Geiger case of In re Halverson, 226 B.R. 22, 29
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1998), for the proposition that malice means targeting the creditor to suffer the
harm, Halverson relies on the pre-Geiger case of In re Long, 774 F.2d at 875, 881.
217. In re Martino, 220 B.R. 129 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998).
218. Id. at 133. The court also relied on pre-Geiger, cases finding sexual harassment claims
nondischargeable. See also In re Bower, 151 F.3d 1028 (4th Cir. 1998) (without citing Geiger,
court limited inquiry to nondischargeability of claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
by finding that the debtor lacked the requisite number of employees to qualify as an employer
under Virginia's Human Rights Act, the basis of the cause of action for sex discrimination in the
case).
219. See, e.g., In re Luppino, 221 B.R. 693, 700 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (former employer
sought to except from the debtor/former employee's discharge debts based on the debtor's receipt
of commercial bribes and breach of duty of loyalty to his employer).
220. 223 B.R. 845, 847-48 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1998).
221. Id. at 845.
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Whether the willful and malicious prongs require separate show-
ings may be inconsequential, since the creditor should succeed in estab-
lishing malice by proving that the debtor intentionally and deliberately
caused the injury under the Geiger standard. The question then arises of
how the creditor demonstrates the requisite intent to injure.
B. Intentional and Deliberate Injury Under Geiger
The Geiger Court compared the requirement of showing an inten-
tional and deliberate injury to a showing of a intentional tort finding that
section 523(a)(6) "triggers in the lawyer's mind the category 'intentional
torts,' as distinguished from negligent or reckless torts. Intentional torts
generally require that the actor intend the 'consequences of an act,' not
simply 'the act itself.' "222 Although Geiger holds the debtor must have
specific intent to cause the injury, it did not define the requisite state of
mind of the actor.22 3 Some courts interpret Geiger as requiring conduct
that constitutes an intentional tort.224 The Fifth Circuit in the case of In
re Miller found that Geiger did not specifically require an intentional
tort. The court found the label of intentional tort too "elusive to sort
intentional acts that lead to injury from acts intended to cause injury. 225
Geiger was interpreted as requiring either objective certainty of harm or
subjective motive to do harm.2 26
222. Kawaahua v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1998) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 8A cmt. a (1964)).
223. Id. at 57. See also 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY T 523.12[l] (15th ed. rev. 1998).
224. In re Mitchell, 227 B.R. 45, 51 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998); In re Kidd, 219 B.R. 278, 284
(Bankr. D. Mont. 1998).
225. In re Miller, 156 F.3d 598, 603-04 (5th Cir. 1998).
226. Id. at 604. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits follow In re Miller's objective substantial
certainty or subjective motive approach to finding willfulness. In re Baldwin, 245 B.R. 131, 135
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000); Markowitz v. Campbell (In re Markowitz), 190 F.3d 455, 464-65 (6th Cir.
1999) (remanding to lower court for determination of whether attorney committing malpractice
desired to cause the consequences of his actions or believed that the consequences were
substantially certain to result from his actions). The Eighth Circuit holds that willfulness means
deliberate or intentional injury. In re Madsen, 195 F.3d 988, 988 (8th Cir. 1999) (creditor
satisfied elements of collateral estoppel establishing that its judgment for misappropriation of
trade secrets was nondischargeable under the willful and malicious exception). But see In re
Englehout, No. 99-3339, 2000 WL 567959, at *2-3 (10th Cir. Sept. 8, 2000) (unpublished
opinion) (critizing the approach of In re Miller as ignoring the history of intent jurisprudence by
failing to appreciate that the notion of subjective, substantial certainty extends the scope of intent
beyond "evil motive" without extending it so far as to include consequences outside the actor's
"ken"); ABF, Inc. v. Russell, 262 B.R. 449, 454 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2001) (asserting In re Miller
formulation is too rigorous to the extent it focuses on the debtor's knowledge or belief that his
actions would cause harm; wilfulness standard set forth in Geiger may be met by something less
than a showing that the debtor's actions were motivated by a specific desire to harm the creditor).
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C. Dischargeability of Disparate Treatment Claims
Although disparate treatment claims under Title VII are often
described as intentional torts, it is not clear if this convenient label sup-
ports a finding of nondischargeability under Geiger's strict standard.22 7
Arguably, the complainant's burden of showing that the debtor intended
to cause the injury is met where an applicant is denied a job in violation
of Title VII or the Americans with Disabilities Act because the employer
clearly intended to injure the applicant by denying him employment and
the employer knew the result of its unlawful decision would deprive the
applicant of wages, prospective advancement, and other benefits. Simi-
larly, an employer's failure to promote an employee or provide benefits
because of an employee's race, religion, sex, age, national origin, or
disability, knowingly deprives the employee of earned opportunities. In
these cases the employer's objective certainty to do harm or subjective
motive to harm is easily established, since the employer knew his acts
would result in the injury. Excepting disparate treatment claims from
the debtor's discharge comports with the purpose of the discharge
exception - assuring debtors remain accountable for damages caused
by their deliberate and intentional acts to injure another person. 228
D. Dischargeability of Sexual and Racial Harassment Claims
In contrast to disparate treatment claims, employers may not appre-
ciate the consequences of their acts of racial or sexual harassment since
employers may not intend to cause the psychological or physical injuries
resulting from this type of discrimination.
The Supreme Court likened sexual harassment claims to intentional
torts in Ellerth, noting that sexual harassment under Title VII "presup-
poses intentional conduct. ' 229 The Court further likened these discrimi-
227. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Assoc., 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (stating punitive damages may be
awarded in intentional discrimination cases where the employer recognizes the perceived risk that
its actions will violate federal law); In re Kelly, 238 B.R. 156, 160-61 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1999)
(stating sexual harassment is an intentional tort). See also North Bank v. Cincinnati Ins. Cos., 125
F.3d 983 (6th Cir. 1997) (insurance company claimed no obligation to pay for defense of
employment discrimination claim since policy excluded intentional torts; without determining
whether employment discrimination constituted an intentional tort, the court found that the policy
drafted by the insurer was ambiguous and discrimination was covered); Ortland v. County of
Tehama, 939 F. Supp. 1465, 1470 (E.D. Cal. 1996) (deciding plaintiff must prove intent under
California's civil rights laws).
228. Disparate impact claims require no showing of intent and therefore, will not fall within
the willful and malicious discharge exception. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971) (finding discriminatory intent not required to show violation of Title VII where requiring
high school education or passing of standardized general intelligence test as condition of
employment was not significantly related to successful job performance and both requirements
disqualified black applicants at a substantially higher rate than white applicants).
229. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756 (1998).
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nation claims to an intentional tort by analogizing an employer's
liability for the harassing conduct of its supervisors to vicarious liability
theories for intentional torts.2 3 ° The Court, however, did not find that
the harasser must intend to injure his victim, as required by Geiger, thus
leaving open the possibility that it can be shown that the harasser solely
intended to commit the act which lead to the injury. This latter interpre-
tation of the harasser's motive precludes the courts from excepting har-
assment claims from discharge because the willful element is lacking.
Yet, the courts continue to except these claims from the debtor's
discharge.
Without significant discussion, one bankruptcy court held that sex-
ual harassment constitutes an intentional tort."3' In re Martino, the post-
Geiger decision excepting a harassment claim from discharge, relied on
the state court's findings that the conduct was willful and malicious
without addressing whether the harasser intended to injure the
plaintiff. 32
In harassment cases, the nature of the injury may dictate whether
the claim is nondischargeable. Employers engaging in sexual and racial
harassment may appreciate that their conduct may cause harm in the
form of lost job opportunities. Yet, they may never intend to cause non-
job related injuries such as depression, nausea, sleeplessness, emotional
distress, or loss of consortium. 233 In quid pro quo 2 34 cases, employers
clearly appreciate the injury of denying an employee a job, promotion,
or other tangible job benefit upon his/her refusal to exchange sexual
favors since the employer knows with substantial certainty that the
employee's failure to exchange the sexual favor will result in a tangible
injury - loss of a job opportunity. Where the exchange of sexual
230. Id.
231. In re Kelly, 238 B.R. at 162.
232. In re Martino, 220 B.R. 129, 133 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998).
233. In the case of In re Smith, 270 B.R. 544 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001), the court excepted the
creditor's sexual harassment claim from discharge without any discussion of Gieger, finding that
the debtor knew the consequences of his actions as evidenced, inter alia, by the jury's award of
punitive damages. The creditor's injuries included anxiety and depression. Id. at 546. Because
the jury did not have a special verdict form, the bankruptcy court did not know under what theory
of sexual harassment the liability was determined. Id. at 547-48.
234. The classification of sexual harassment cases as either quid pro quo or hostile
environment began with academicians and was adopted by the judiciary. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752.
The terms do not appear in Title VII, yet serve a useful purpose of illustrating the difference
between cases involving a threat which is carried out and offensive conduct in general. Id. at 753.
Quid pro quo harassment involves a demand for sexual favors linked to the grant or denial of a
tangible job benefit. Meitor Say. Bank. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at
752-53. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a). Hostile environment harassment involves sufficiently
pervasive or severe harassment based on sex, which unreasonably interferes with a person's work
performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. Meritor Sav.
Bank, 477 U.S. at 65-66.
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favors is made, and the employee keeps his job but suffers psychological
harm, however, it may be impossible to show the employer knew the
employee would suffer a psychological injury. This is so, notwithstand-
ing that the employer intended the harm which would result if the
exchange was not made, e.g., loss of a promotion. Arguably, in the
employer's mind the potential injury to the employee by virtue of his
conduct was limited to the loss of an employment opportunity. Unless
the employer appreciates that quid pro quo harassment may cause
employees emotional or other physical harm, the claimant will be unable
to establish the debtor's requisite substantial certainty that the harm
would occur.2 35 Seemingly in quid pro quo harassment cases, willful-
ness can only be shown if the debtor is the actor and intends to cause the
tangible job detriment or other psychological or physical injury.236
Where the debtor is not the actor, but is vicariously liable to the claimant
for his supervisor's actions, it will be impossible to establish the requi-
site intent unless the claimant shows the debtor advised the supervisor to
engage in the misconduct.237
The unique nature of hostile environment sexual and racial harass-
ment cases may preclude plaintiffs from making the requisite showing of
intent to cause the injury. In hostile environment cases, it is difficult to
show the employer deliberately intended to cause the injury resulting
from a workplace poisoned with sexual innuendo or racial hostility.
Although, the employer may intend to create a sexually or racially
charged atmosphere in the workplace, the employer may not intend to
cause the plaintiff psychological or physical injury. Although, in hostile
environment cases involving supervisor misconduct, an employer is lia-
ble unless it successfully establishes the affirmative defense set forth in
Ellerth,238 the debtor's willfulness must still be shown under section
523. A showing that the supervisor intended to cause the injury, making
the employer liable, still does not establish intent on the part of the
235. The employer's knowledge of the potential injuries may be established by showing that
the employer participated in a diversity training program during which the injuries associated with
harassment were discussed.
236. In determining whether a supervisor's quid pro quo harassment is within the scope of his
employment, Ellerth adopted the Restatement's "aided in the agency relation" rule, finding that
where a tangible employment action is taken against the plaintiff by a supervisor, the supervisor is
acting for the employer and the employer is absolutely liable. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758-59.
237. In re Baldwin, 245 B.R. 131, 136 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000) (debt stemming from debtor's
assisting other defendants in violently striking and injuring creditor satisfied Geiger's willful
requirement). See also In re Moore, I B.R. 52 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1979) (finding that individual
debtor, as overall manager of corporation's property, is responsible for discrimination against
residents culminating in unjustifiable eviction of residents, notwithstanding that no showing was
made that the debtor personally engaged in the misconduct).
238. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760-65 (1998).
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employer, unless the employer knew about the harassment. 239 In cases
involving co-worker harassment, the employer's liability is premised on
traditional negligence principles requiring the plaintiff to show the
employer knew or should have known of the harassment.24 ° Again,
unless the employer had actual knowledge of the wrongdoing, it will be
difficult to establish willfulness since the employer was not the actor
and, without knowledge, could not have intended to cause the injury.
Notwithstanding that under Geiger a showing of negligence is insuffi-
cient to establish willfulness, the plaintiffs showing that the conduct
was notorious, thereby establishing that the employer knew of the mis-
conduct, might be sufficient to impute intent to injure to the employer
for dischargeability purposes. In that case, the employer's intention to
cause the injury can be gleaned from his awareness of the discriminatory
acts.
Certainly, where the individual harasser is the debtor, a stronger
showing for excepting the debt from discharge can be made. Often, the
issues of malice and willfulness are determined in the state court and are
entitled to preclusive effect in a subsequent bankruptcy case. Although
the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not unique in
bankruptcy, the doctrine has significant import in actions to determine
dischargeability since the findings of the state court may preclude a sub-
sequent inquiry into willfulness or malice by the bankruptcy court.
VII. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL PRINCIPLES
The principle of collateral estoppel applies in bankruptcy cases.24'
Where an issue is litigated under state law, the collateral estoppel princi-
ples of the relevant state apply.242
A creditor may avoid relitigation of the issues of willful and mali-
cious under section 523(a)(6) of the Code by showing that the jury
instructions in a state trial required a finding of willful and malicious
under the same standards considered under the discharge exception.243
Conversely, the failure to make findings of intent following a trial in
state court will prompt a trial on the issue in the bankruptcy court. The
239. The requirement that the conduct be severe or pervasive supports a showing of intent to
injure.
240. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758-59. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(d).
241. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991).
242. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982); In re St. Laurent, 991 F.2d 672
(1 th Cir. 1993).
243. In re Scarborough, 171 F.3d 638, 642-43 (8th Cir. 1999). Cf In re Slosberg, 225 B.R. 9,
20 (Bankr. D. Me. 1998) (determining collateral estoppel unavailable in discharge proceeding
where standard for malice differed from state law requirements).
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judgment creditor in the case of In re Betts24" sought to declare an
administrative law judge's workman's compensation award nondis-
chargeable. Although the evidence supported the inference that the
defendants either negligently or recklessly disregarded their duty to pro-
vide workman's compensation insurance, no demonstration of the requi-
site willful intent to injure required under section 523(a)(6) was made by
the administrative law judge. The failure to make the requisite determi-
nations in the state court proceeding required a determination of the
issue by the bankruptcy court.245
Creditors should always anticipate a bankruptcy filing by the defen-
dant and take steps to protect their interests. The decision in Geiger
makes it imperative that findings from the lower court and those con-
tained in settlement documents are drafted to accomplish the goals of the
parties. Plaintiffs in discrimination actions seeking to avoid a subse-
quent discharge of their claims in bankruptcy, and the uncertainty and
expense associated with a trial to determine dischargeability, should
attempt to draft findings of fact and conclusions of law reflecting that
the debtor intended to cause the creditor's injury and acted with the req-
uisite malice. Because the courts are still grappling over the meaning of
malice, a creditor should insist on findings encompassing the different
standards of malice applied by the bankruptcy courts, to wit: implied
malice, special malice, and targeting the harm. The creditor should
always include the parties' agreement that the debt is nondischargeable
under section 523(a)(6) in any settlement documents.2 46
Often, a debtor is clandestinely planning to file bankruptcy and,
requiring additional time for pre-bankruptcy planning, agrees to settle a
case on the eve of trial or execution. Often, the debtor will insist that the
settlement documents reflect the customary language that the settlement
does not reflect any wrongdoing by the debtor. Although such language
does not preclude a creditor from excepting the obligation from dis-
charge in a subsequent bankruptcy case, it will necessitate a new trial in
the bankruptcy court on the issue of whether the conduct was willful and
malicious.
Dischargeability relates to excepting a creditor's claim from dis-
244. 174 B.R. 636 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994).
245. Id. at 649-50. See In re Miller, 156 F.3d 598, 598 (5th Cir. 1998) (explaining that issue
preclusion did not apply in favor of either party since the jury did not determine whether the
debtor acted with fraudulent intent or the objective probability of injuring the creditor).
246. This request, however, may prompt the employer's consideration of the effect of the
agreement in an ensuing bankruptcy case, thereby goading the employer's refusal to agree to any
findings of willfulness or malice. Even if the employer agrees to nondischargeability, the findings
of willfulness and malice should still be included in the documents protecting the creditor in the
event the bankruptcy court refuses to enforce the nondischargeability clause.
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charge and preserving the creditor's rights to prosecute the claim after
the case is closed. In contrast to claims held by a creditor, often an
individual debtor is the holder of a discrimination claim. Desiring to
shield the damages stemming from his cause of action, such a debtor
may attempt to exempt this type of claim making the proceeds unavaila-
ble to his creditors.
VIII. EXEMPTING DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY
The issue of whether a debtor's employment discrimination claim
may be exempt from the claims of creditors pursuant to section 522 of
the Code must be addressed in the bankruptcy pre-planning stages as the
debtor's choice of relief - chapter 7, 11, or 13 - is affected by
whether his claim is exempt.24 7 If the claim is not exempt, the debtor
may delay filing bankruptcy until after collecting the proceeds of his
claim and perhaps converting those proceeds to exempt assets before
filing.248 Or, the debtor may opt to seek relief under chapter 11 or 13 by
confirming a plan providing for a modest payment to his creditors from
future earnings without sacrificing his interest in the discrimination
claim. The "best interest of creditors" test, requiring that the debtor
affirmatively show that the creditors will receive more under the plan
than under a chapter 7 liquidation, may not create an insurmountable
hurdle, since it will be difficult to value the discrimination claim at
confirmation.249
The exemption analysis begins with a determination of whether
federal or state law exemption statutes apply. The federal exemptions
permit the debtor to exempt a payment, not to exceed $17,425, received
by the debtor on account of "personal bodily injury, not including pain
and suffering or compensation for actual pecuniary loss... 25
247. 11 U.S.C. section 522 provides a category of federal exemptions and the right of states to
"opt out" of the federal exemptions scheme. Exemptions are only available to individual debtors.
248. The conversion of nonexempt assets into exempt assets prior to seeking relief under the
Code may constitute a fraudulent transfer subject to avoidance under sections 544(b) or 548 of the
Code. Also, a debtor engaging in this type of conduct may face an objection to his discharge
pursuant to section 727 of the Code if the trustee prevails in setting aside the transfer as fraudulent
under section 548. I1 U.S.C. §§ 544(d), 548, 727 (1994). But see Havoco of Amer. Ltd. v. Hill,
790 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 2001) (holding that conversion of non-exempt assets to constitutionally
exempt homestead with the intent to hinder, delay, and defraud your creditors is not voidable as a
fraudulent transfer).
249. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7), 1325(a)(4) (1994). The valuation of a debtors' legal claim is
conducted through an evidentiary hearing in conjunction with confirmation. II U.S.C. § 502(c)
(1994) (governing estimation of contingent or unliquidated claims against the bankruptcy estate).
The court may opt to hold a "mini-trial" to determine the reasonable value of the claim. Since
juries are often unpredictable, the court's estimation may be far off the mark, providing the debtor
a windfall after confirmation and liquidation of the discrimination claim.
250. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(D) (2001) (emphasis added).
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State exemption laws vary with some states permitting debtors to
exempt the proceeds of "personal injury actions"' 51 and tort claims
affecting "personal" rather than "property" interests. 2  Other state
exemptions are limited to payment on account of "personal bodily
injury" of the debtor. 3 Courts determining the exempt status of dis-
crimination awards under state statutes focus on the statutory language
distinguishing between those statutes which require "personal" injury
and the more narrow statutes requiring "bodily" injury.2 54  The courts
unanimously refuse to exempt sexual harassment claims under state stat-
utes requiring "bodily" injury, finding that psychological and emotional
injuries do not suffice.2 15
The male chapter 7 debtor in the case of In re Marshall sought to
exempt the proceeds of his sexual harassment claim under a state law
exempting "[flights of action for injuries to the person of the debtor. 25 6
The court held that the injury giving rise to physical damage was insuffi-
cient. The initial injury must be to the person such that an injured debtor
is deprived from using his human capital to gain a fresh start.257 Simi-
larly, a chapter 7 debtor's claimed exemption of proceeds from a sexual
harassment claim was disallowed in In re Langa where the Illinois stat-
ute required "personal bodily injury.'"258 The court refused to expand the
statute to include proceeds of a sexual harassment claim which the court
found was "clearly a personal injury. 2 59
Acknowledging that Congress intended ambiguous bankruptcy
exemptions to be interpreted in favor of the debtor, the court in In re
251. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 34-28.1 (Michie 1994).
252. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 513.427, 513.430(11) (1982). See In re Kininson, 177 B.R. 632
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1995) (holding state law exempting property not subject to attachment or
execution is sufficient to cover proceeds of tort claims affecting injury to the "person" which
claims are not assignable under state law). See 14 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, Exemptions (15th
ed. rev. 1998) (containing useful compilation of each state's exemption statutes).
253. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-1001(h)(4) (West 1992) (emphasis added). New York
provides for a bankruptcy exemption for a payment, not exceeding $7,500, on account of
"personal bodily injury" excluding pain and suffering or compensation for actual pecuniary loss.
N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 282(3) (McKinney 2001).
254. See In re Langa, 222 B.R. 843 (Bankr. C.D. 11. 1998); In re Ciotta, 222 B.R. 631 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1998); In re Marshall, 208 B.R. 690 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1997).
255. In re Chapman, 223 B.R. 137 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998).
256. In re Marshall, 208 B.R. at 690. See also MINN. ANN. STAT § 550.37(22) (West 2000 &
Supp. 2000).
257. Id. at 692. Cf. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (describing how
actionable hostile environment detracts from job performance, discourages employees from
staying at work and advancing their careers).
258. In re Langa, 222 B.R. at 844 (quoting 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-1001(h)(4) (West
1992) (emphasis added)).
259. Id. at 845. See In re Chapman, 223 B.R. at 139-40 (describing how seven days later,
bankruptcy court for the Central District of California finds same Illinois statute latently
ambiguous and looks to Black's Law Dictionary for meaning of "bodily" and "personal" injury).
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Ciotta refused to narrowly construe the definition of "bodily injury" as
requiring permanent bodily injury.2 6 ° Instead, the court found the debtor
had the burden of showing she suffered "appreciable physical injury" as
a result of the alleged harassing conduct.16 1 The debtor in the case of In
re Ciotta sought to exempt $28,000 for a pre-petition sexual harassment
lawsuit. As of the date of the petition, the case had not yet proceeded to
trial.262 Because the debtor failed to prove she suffered an appreciable
physical injury, the court granted her thirty days in which to provide a
declaration of a competent witness qualified to attest to this fact. 263
Courts tend to recognize an exemption for payments relating to har-
assment claims where the statutory exemption covers proceeds of "per-
sonal injury. '2 64 A sexual harassment claim was deemed exempt under
a Maryland statute requiring only personal injury - not bodily injury.265
The failure of the state statute to limit exemptions to personal "bodily"
injury supported exempting claims for injury to the debtor's psyche,
including mental anguish.266
The Virginia statute at issue in the case of In re Webb exempted all
causes of action for "personal injury. '2 67 The court reasoned that since
the debtor was seeking compensatory damages in her Title VII hostile
work environment claim, and Virginia permitted compensatory damage
awards in personal injury cases, the proceeds of the harassment claim
were exempt.268 The court, however, did not reach the issue of whether
to extend its ruling to all Title VII causes of action. 269
Where the debtor's unliquidated sexual harassment claim contains
elements of both personal and property damage, the property damage
portion of the claim is not exempt.27 ° In the case of In re Kininson, a
decision applying Missouri's exemption statute, which exempts property
not subject to attachment and execution in the state, the court found that
damages recovered by the debtor for injury to her person, including for
embarrassment, medical expenses, emotional distress, or other harms to
260. In re Ciota, 222 B.R. 631, 631-32 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1998).
261. Id. at 633.
262. Id. at 626.
263. Id. at 633-34.
264. In re Dobbins, 249 B.R. 849 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000); In re Webb, 210 B.R. 266 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1997), aff'd.., 214 B.R. 553 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997); In re Kininson, 177 B.R. 632
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1995).
265. In re Dobbins, 249 BR. at 852.
266. Id. (citations omitted).
267. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-28.1 (Michie 1994).
268. In re Webb, 210 B.R. at 273.
269. Id. (noting that it "need not decide the more difficult issue of whether all Title VII causes
of action are exempt" under Virginia's exemption statutes).
270. In re Kininson, 177 B.R. 632, 632 (Bankr. E.D.Mo. 1995) (citing Mo. REV. STAT.
§§ 513.427, 513.430-31(11) (1982)).
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the person, were exempt because such claims were not subject to attach-
ment. 271 Recovery realized for loss of wages and punitive damages
were deemed non-exempt and, therefore property of the estate. 2
The Nebraska statute exempts "proceeds and benefits" for personal
injuries, but does not exempt a personal injury "cause of action" or
claim.273 In applying this statute, the In re Key bankruptcy court sug-
gested that the trustee elected to administer the debtor's cause of action
for employment discrimination because the Nebraska statute exempting
the proceeds and benefits paid as compensation for personal injuries
contemplate the liquidation of a cause of action before the exemption
could be claimed.274 The proceeds of the employment discrimination
might include non-exempt proceeds, depending upon whether the statue
was construed narrowly to include only proceeds from bodily injury or
broadly to cover proceeds from psychological injuries.275
In cases governed by the federal exemption requiring "bodily
injury" it appears that the proceeds of any type of discrimination claims
are not exempt unless the claimant suffers actual bodily injury. The leg-
islative history supports this interpretation, providing that the exemption
is designed to exempt payments relating to "actual bodily injury, such as
the loss of a limb .... 276
IX. CONCLUSION
The resolution of the inherent conflicts between the deterrent and
rehabilitative goals of Title VII and the Code's aim of maximizing dis-
tribution to creditors, requires that Congress amend the Code to provide
a specific exception to dischargeability for pre-petition claims stemming
from employment discrimination or, alternatively that Congress overrule
by statute the Supreme Court's decision in Geiger codifying willfulness
to mean intention to do the act, not cause the injury. In individual cases,
a specific discharge exception for discrimination claims will preserve
the estate for all the creditors, assuring their equal treatment. The debtor
is deterred from engaging in future discrimination because he is not dis-
271. Id. at 634-35.
272. Id. The analysis undertaken by the Kin inson court, allocating damages realized from the
exempt claim against damages realized from non-exempt claims, safeguards against the
impermissible expansion of the personal injury exemption to cover compensatory damages
relating to property damage.
273. In re Key, 255 BR. 217, 220 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2000).
274. Id. at 220. The court recognized that in some cases where the only recovery available
would be compensation for personal injuries, it would be known prior to judgment that the
proceeds of the cause of action would be exempt. This would permit the trustee to abandon the
claim if administration would be burdensome to the bankruptcy estate. Id. at 220.
275. Id.
276. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 361-62 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6318.
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charged from his obligation to satisfy the discriminatee's claim. Alter-
natively, relaxing the standard for establishing willfulness will deter
discriminatory conduct because the creditor's burden of establishing
willful and malicious injury will be diminished, thereby enabling dis-
crimination victims to preserve their claims.277
Amending the Code to provide priority status for pre-petition back
pay capped at $15,000, regardless of whether the back pay accrued dur-
ing the ninety days proceeding the filing, will encourage employers to
reinstate employees, or risk further depletion of the bankruptcy estate,
which in turn would jeopardize their prospects for reorganization. Addi-
tionally, the impact of $15,000 on the creditor body is small, yet pro-
vides incentive for the debtor in the ubiquitous chapter 11 clamoring to
satisfy priority claims. Also, public policy supports compensating dis-
criminatees before other creditors.
Although amending the Code to provide priority status for back pay
accruing postpetition and stemming from a pre-petition violation will
encourage the debtor to end the discriminatory conduct through volun-
tary reinstatement, it may also force employers to reinstate employees
with bogus or objectionable claims so as to not risk further accrual of
postpetition back pay and the concomitant increase in administrative
expenses which must be paid on the effective date. Dissipating estate
resources by compensating employees who hold bogus or objectionable
claims is contrary to the Code's goal of equal and fair treatment of credi-
tors and threatens the employer's ability to reorganize. The allowance
of administrative expense status only after a final judicial determination
finding the employer unlawfully engaged in discrimination provides
incentive to the debtor/employer to reinstate employees where
warranted.
The proposed amendments to the Code currently under considera-
tion by Congress focus on raising the barriers for filing chapter 7 and
limiting a debtor's exemptions. Perhaps in the future, under pressure
from the NLRB, and as more decisions emerge exploring the dishar-
mony between Title VII and the Code, Congress will probe the conflict.
277. Relaxing the standard may enable other pre-petition tort claimants from excepting their
claims from discharge, discouraging the debtor from filing bankruptcy for the purpose of
discharging certain tort claims, and perhaps threatening the ability to salvage companies and jobs
through reorganization where a substantial portion of the claims are based on tort.
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